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CHAPTER I
KOREA:

"SHUTTLECOCK AMONG NATIONS"

In the light of events too reoent to be properly

.

termed "history," the peninsula of Korea, off in a far corner
of the world, has assumed an importanoe which few people suspected.

Lord Curzonts description of Korea as a "shuttlecook

among nations •••• a sort of Tom Tiddler's ground between China,
Russia, and Japan," s~ems as true today as when it was first
pronounoed. l

~ar, to be sure, is not new to Korea.

Standing as

she does at the very gateway between Japan and greater Asi. t
Korea, by virtue of her unique geographical position, has for
centuries provided a meeting place and battleground of the Chinese and Japanese Empires.

:rhe Korean question, however, was

1 George N. Curzon, Problems of the Far East, Revised
Edition, London, 1896, 188-189. From time ~trme in ita long
history the peninsula known to us today as Korea has assumed va
ious names, several of which will reour in this thesis. It is
best known to its own people as Chao-hsien, or in the contracted
form of Chosen or Choaun, a term of Japanese origin signifying
"Morning calm." The name Korea, derived from the native pronunciation of Kao-li (or Ko-rai), supposedly the name of a prehistoric kingdom in Manchuria, is that adopted by the Royal Geographic Society and the United States State Department. Since
this name, Korea, enjoys the most general usage today, it will
be employed in the following pages, except in quoted passages
where t~e terms Chosen or Chiao-hsien are used in the source of
the que Let t'.>n.
1

2

not one that concerned China and Japan alone.

In the latter

half of the nineteenth century Russia, Great Britain, and the
United States joined the powers to whose strategy Korea had provided an historic fulcrum.
Russla In partlcular saw in Korea the fulfl11ment ot

.

the need and desire for an ice-free, all-year-round port, which
centuries of history had impressed upon her.

As early as 1881

she had made an unsuccessful attempt to acqulre such a port in
Korea.

In later years she sought to reallze her ambitions by

the use of military force.

These attempts culminated in the

1890's In a concerted drive to the Paciflc, which was related to
the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, then the chief
single factor in Russian Far Eastern pollcy .• 2
The purpose of this thesis, brlefly stated, .is to
trace the historleal backgrounds of Russian interest In Korea,
to discover the considerations which motlvated this particular
interest, and to outline Russian attempts to acquire a foothold
on the Korean peninsula, against the broad background of Russian
imperialistic expansion in the If'arEast.
Writlng in 1894 Lord Curzon descrlbed the international position of Korea In these words:
A more anomalous polltical condition certainly did not
exist in the world than that of a country which Itself

2 David J. Dallln,
Haven, 1949, M.

!a!.!!!!.!. g.! Russla !!l!!!,!.,

New

claimed to be both independent and dependent, and could
produce powerfUl evidenoe in support of either hypothesis; and as to which outside Powers advanced pretensions
of suzerainty, control, protectorate, alliance, mostfavoured-nation treatment, or teohnical equality, for
all o! which there was a considerable show of justification.
This state of affairs had arisen, aocording to Curson, first,
out of the peculiar geographica-l posl tion of Korea, secondly,
out of the inconSistent, sometimes nirectly contradiotory polioy pursued by China with respeot to Korea."

Hence .. before pro'"

ceeding to a consideration of Russian designs on Korea, it is
necessary to arrive at some understanding of Korea's positIon
both with regard to China and Japan, and also with respect to
the Western powers which in the last deoade of the nineteenth
century suoceeded in nopening upll Korea as they had Japan a deoade before •
. To any such understanding an appreCiation of Korea's
unique geographical position is a necessary preoondition.

Sit-

uated between the Yellow Sea and that of Japan, the peninsula
of Korea, despite its exposed condition, had until the time ot
its so-called ftopening" come less into contaot with other nation.
than any other oountry 1n the world. 5

3 Curzon, Problems

-

£!

~

Surrounded on three sides

!!£!!!l,

188.

4 Ib1d., IS8-189.

5 Alexis Krausse,
Que st1on, London, 1900, 6.

~!!£!!!i,

!l! Hlsto£Z

~

!1!

4

by sea, Korea's sole land frontier is that supplied by the Tiumen and Yalu rivers which, flowing northeast and southwest respectively, delimit Korean territory from that of Russia and Manchuria.

The peninsula is six hundred miles long and one hundred

thirty-five miles wide on the average; its total area is about
86,000 square miles.

The Korean coastline, all out of propor-

tion to the size of the peninsula itself, is largely indented
with bays and harbors, thereby affording great
naval and commercial purposes.
sula is thus self-evident:

possibil~.ties

for

The strategic value of the penin-

situated at the entrance to the Gult

of Pechli, the gateway between Japan and Asia, Korea commands
the approaches to Tietsin and to Peklng itself. 6 Vladivostok 1s
but a hundred mlles from Korean territory to the east; Port Arthur 1s but twice that distance to the west of Korea.

Perhaps

even more important for the purposes of the present study is
the fact that whereas the harbors and inlets on the west coast
of Korea are frozen in the winter months, those on the east coast
remain open all year round.
While the traditions of the founding of the Korean
Kingdom go back to primaeval times, these early aceounts are
largely of a superstitious character. 7

!§gQ-~,

Eastern

It is known, however,

6 W111iam L. Langer, The Di~lomaci of Imeerialism,
Second Edition, New York, 951, 687
7 M. F'rederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in

!.!l!., Saton Rouge, 1946, 21.

-

-

-

-

5

that owing to her situation midway between China and Japan,
Korea was viewed with covetous eyes by both, and at various
times in her long history had occasion to try her strength
against the forces of each. 8 Though for centuries ruled by
successive dynasties of monarchs, there was scarcely a time in
her history when she did not acknowledge a greater or lesser dependence on either China or Japan.

The claims of the latter

power, dating from the nebulous days of the early Ohristian era,
were both earlier in point of origin and were exercised over the
longer period of time'.

In modern times, however, Japanese claims

to Korea were allowed to shrink into a virtual state of desuetude
during the last years of the Shogunate, and it was not until the
revolution of 1868 that any oonoerted attempt was made to reestablish Japanese hegemony.

Thenoeforward, Japan, by virtue of

her own political reSUSCitation, was to reestablish a powerful
influence in Korea though, as Curzon observes, at the expense ot
"the feudatory relationship which for so many centuries it had
been her boastful pretension to maintain. n9
Several factors combined to militate against the immediate restoration of Japanese overlordship in Korea.

Not the

.
8 An acoount of several such attempts, inoluding the
famous expedition of Hideyoshl to Korea in the late 15th century,
is to be found in Krausse, The Far East: Its Histo£f and Its
~uest1on, 61-84.
For a more-deti!l~reatment see rthUr-,udson
Brown,.1he Mastery .2! !!l!. .!!.t!!.!1, New York, 1919, 20-25.
9 CurBon, Problems .2!

~ ~!!!!,

191

6

least of these was the fact that the Koreans themselves were not
well disposed to such control.
to seek.

The reasons for this are not far

In October of 1866 a French fleet had been sent to Ko-

rea for the purpose of exacting compensation for the murder of
several F'rench eoo1esiastics engaged in missionary activities In
Korea.

In thls crisis the Korean government had applied to Ja-

pan for aid

~nd

assistance.

Japan had her hands full at the

tlme,. and no material aid was forthcoming.

The Koreans resisted

the F)rench Invaslon with such energy that the French admlral,
reallzing the expediency of a hasty retreat, returned to China
without having accomplished his purpose. 10

The Koreans. for

their own part, never forgot Japan's failure to come to their
aid.

Consequently, when in 1868 a Japanese embassy arrived in

Seoul to present the formal announcement of the Restoration of
the Meiji and to invite from the Koreans a renewal of their ancient friendship, the reply was an insolent re fusal. l1
In 1871, in reply to a similar Japanese proposal, the
Tai-Wen-K~~.

acting as Regent on behalf of the young Korean king,

returned an answer which left little doubt as to Korean sentiment
in the matter.

His reply runs in part al folloWII ' "In your dis-

10 Krausse, The Far East, 87; for an account of the
expedl tlon see Joseph r.-Longf~ !!!!. Stotz S!.! Korea, New York,
1911, 237.
11

Curzon, Problems

.2.! !h! !!!:!!.!!, 191.

7

patch you have made many insinuations of your having adopted
aign customs; we oan assure you that Japan is Japan, Korea 18
Korea--but Korea has its own customs."

The document specificall

mentions Japan's failure to come to Korea's aid in the French in
vasion •
•••• According to our old treaty of friendship, whenever either is attacked by barbarians, the other is
to help_ To show our honesty, when the barbarians
went into your country, we immediately wrote to you
that we had made every preparation to help you.
During the French attack on Korea we day and night
expected that you would come with your forces to our
aid; but not having received your assistance we wrote
and informed you of our distress, informing you of
our pOSition, and asking for immediate help. You
have neither sent us aid, nor any answer to our dispatch. From that day our treaty of friendship was at
an end. We no longer consider each other friends but
enemies, ••• Not only have you broken the treaty as above described, but you have also broken another very
chief point of treaty in adopting the manners and customs of the Western barbarians •••• It is useless to go
into any correspondence, because the wrong you have
doneus is so great, that your apologies wl11 not avail.
The only alternative is a bloody war--a war that wl11
cost Japan all its warriors; and then we will bring
you to terms. 12
Although some assert that this version of the reply 1s not a
true copy, there is no doubt that the Tal Wen Kun made a reply
that was regarded by the Japanese as insulting and oontemp·
tuous. 15 Japan, however, was too poor and too much hampered by
complications consequent on lts internal revolution to maintain-

12

Longford,!h!. Stou .2! Korea, 297-298.

13

-Ibid.

8

its claim by the use of force.

The Samurai party especially

were infuriated, and it was ohief1y to satisfy their belligerent
disPositions that the government undertook the expeditions to
Formosa and the Liu-Kiu Islands in 1874. 14

Two suocessive mis-

sions were dispatched to Korea in 1873 and 1874 in an effort to
reestablish Japanese author! ty 'by peace tal me,ans; both proved
completely unsuccessful.

However, the Japanese statesmen of the

time wisely concluded that Japan's interests would best be

se~d

not by a polioy of aggression, but rather by a peaceful policy
of economio penetration and oommercial control. 15
In her relationship to China, Korea has stood for centuries as what has been called "the most perfect example of the
peculiar Confuoian order of Far Eastern international relations
which preoeded the Western state sy~tems.ft16

In modern times,

Chinese influenoe in Korea oan be traced baok to the inoeption
at the most reoent Korean dynasty some six oenturies ago.

Under

the patronage of the Ming Dynasty, Li Tan, a soldier ot fortune
known in history as Tai-cho, raised himself to the Korean throne
in 1392.

Breaking completely with the previous Wang liynas;t;;y,

Tai-cho established his Court and capital at Aan-Yang, popularly

· xiv.

~

14

Langer, Diplomaoy

15

Curzon, . ;.P.;;.r.;;.o.;;.b.-l_em;;;;;;;.s .2.!

Imperialism, 16S.

!h! !!..t!!ll, 192.

...

known as Seoul. 17

9

.

Chinese became the official spoken language,

as well as the language of Korean literature.

Confucianism was

substituted for Buddhism as the official religion, and governmental reorganization was undertaken on the Chinese model, which
until 1894 was faithfully reproduoed in the Court at Seoul.
However, though possessed of far more natural and basic
conditions for Korean alleglance--in the form of common language,
religion, customs, philosophy, as well as territorial conneotion.-than oould be advanced by Japa.n, China t s position in Korea i8
rather more difficult of analysis and description.
culty is largely one of terminology.

The diffl-

In most Western llterature

on the subject, the international status of Korea Is described
as that of a "vassal" to China.

But 11ke so many terms, pecul-

iarly western in origln and connotation, which have 'Qeen seized
upon by hlstorians to describe Far Eastern politlcal and soolal
institutions, the term "vassal" carries with it many attributes
which were in no way characteristic of the relationship of Korea
to China.

Indeed, it was a misunderstanding arising from the use

of this very term "vassal" which stood as the first and moat formidable obstacle to the establishment of amicable relations bebetween Korea and the Western powers in their first contacts in

capital."

17

-Ibid.,

71.

The name Seoul means literally "the

10
the latter half of the nineteenth century.lS

Hence the practical

necessi ty of v1ewing the relationship in terms of the non-legal,
familistic Confucian order, rather than in those of Western international law. 19
While a detailed analysis is necessarily beyond the
scope of this study, it might

~e

well at this point to mention

several historical traditions which testify to Korea's depend ....
ence upon China.

Particularly notable among these. was the annual

Tribute Mission from Seoul to Peking, conveying a specified tribute, and receiving in return the Calendar for the next year whicb
it was the imperial prerogative to prepare, an outward mark ot
Korean dependence to receive.

Through the years the tribute had

been gradually reduoed and the·mission had assumed a more or le81
ceremonial character to which, in the early years of the nineteenth century, a practical and mercantIle aspect was lent by
its being used for the export to China of the King's red ginesin&.20

Another practice, carried on since the time of the Man-

chu invasions in the early seventeenth century and indicative of

1S

W. W. Rockhill, Chinats Intercourse with Korea from
12.~, London, t§05, 3.
-

19

Nelson, Korea

!h!. !Ylh Centll;!:l
xv-xvi.

~

!h!

~

qrders

!a

Eastern

!!!!,

20 Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 198-199. Gin.sini
was a plant greatly vAlaea fOr me~iurr ~reouperative purposes in the Orient, and Korea was one of the principla areas at
its production. On the subject of Tribute MiSSions, cf. also
Nelson, Korea ~ ~ ~ Orders in Eastern !!!!, 17-19; 94ff.

11
the same relationship, was the investiture of the Korean monarch
with the patent of royalty by the Chinese Emperor.

These and '

other evidences of Korea's dependence upon China survived until
July, 1894, and stood in mute testimony to the reality of that
relationship.
These evidences of dependence upon China did not, however, preclude the possibility of Korea's retaining a practical
measure of independence in her internal relations,

The reason

for this lies deep at the roots of the ConfUcian system, the paternalistic nature of which is perhaps best characterized by M.
Frederick Nelson as "that of a Chinese father or elder brother,
while Chao-hsien, the lesser nation, maintained the attitude ot
a filial son and respectful younger brother toward China, the
central nation •••• As with the natural son, the father nation was
by Confucian theory discouraged from exercising its control except in times of crisis. n21 ThiS, in turn, would serve to explain many of the seeming inconsistencies in Chinese policy with
respeot to Korea, whlch were interpreted by Western observers as
the fruits of diplomatic indioision.

The over-all relationship

of Korea to China is well summed-up by Nelsons
But being thoroughly Confucian Chao-hsien •••
viewed dependenoy upon China as an ~onor or mark of
oivilization whioh barbarians oould not "attain.
Though in theory her submission was abject and complete, her status oannot in faot be termed flva~salage'l

21

Korea

~ ~ ~ Order~

in

t

Eastern Asia, 91-92.

12

for the Far East possessed no counterpart of the word
'suzerainty' as It was understood In the West. Before
external pressure was felt on the relatlonshlp, as late
as the beginnlng of the~neteenth oentury, its outward
evidences went little beyond formal submission and tribute, the practice of investiture being only the conflrmation of the de facto ruler. What Is more important, the
internal fiens of oontrol and policy were lett to the
discretlon of the king, whlle external relations, necessarily 11ml ted to J.i'ar Eastern natlona, were also dlrected by the individual ruler~. Clearly, then, the positlon
of Chao-hsien was far from being uncomfortable. 22
Thus, though the status of Korea was quite clearly defined in the
Confucian order, it is In no way surprising that Western observers, failing to appreciate the unique character of the relationshlp, should have found in Korea a nation neither sovereign enougk
to conduct independent relations nor subject enough to shift responsibility for its actions on China.
Koreats early relations with the West were confined,
for the most part, to the efforts of a few missionaries and traders to open a wedge for purposes of evangelization and exploitation.

As early as 1593 the Jesuit, Cespedes, had insinuated him-

selt into the "hermit kingdom."

In the later years of the

eighteenth century Catholic doctrine entered Korea through books,
from 1784 Catholic missionaries, mainly F'Nnch, began to enter
the country and taught their

ere~d

with moderate success.

In

1839 a court party came into power which favored the exclusion
of foreigners and the extirpation of all traces of Christianity.
the immediate result being a persecution which culminated in the

-

22

Ibid., 92-93.

13
aurder of three French prlests and some one hundred thirty ot

thelr converts. 23

News of the incldent was rather slow ln

reaching the outside" world, and it was not until 1846 that a mis8ion was dispatched to inquire into the execution.

The Korean

government, stressing Korea's dependence on China, replied in
effect that it
with her.

W88

only through China that Westerners could deal

China in turn, notwiehlng to alter the relationship

ln which Korea had traditionally stood, persisted in a policy
which t.o the West appeared anomalous--that of declaring Korea··
dependent, but refusing at the same time to accept legal responsibility for Korea's transgressions.
The year 1866 is one of major importance ln modern
Korean history.

For some twenty years the F'rench had taken. no

further steps to exact conpensatlon for the murder of her mlssionaries, and the outrage had been virtually forgotten.

In

these intervening years several more F'rench missionaries had ventured across the frontier.

However, a fal •• report from Ohina

that the Chinese were putting to d,eath all Christians in the empire served to intensity the native anti-foreign sentiment. 24

Th. cry "Death to the Christians" was raised in the streets ot
Seoul, and launched a persecution which resulted in the violent

23 Griffes, Oorea, 347-367; Longford, The St££l of
Korea, 242-273. These accounts are based, for tne-mos part, o~
Eharles Dallet's Ristorie S! l'8s1ise ~ Coree, Paris, 1874, II.
24

Nelson, Korea

~ ~ ~

Orders, 115.

,

14

...
deaths of other F'rench priests and hundreds of converts.

This

time the news was rather quick to take hold, and a gunboat ot
the F"rench Asiatic fleet was immediately sent to make surveys ot
the western coastline of Korea.

In an

1nterchang~

of diplomatio

correspondence between the Chinese government and the French
/

Charge, M. de Bellonet, China'aga1n repudiated responsibility
for the acts of Korea. 25

The outcome of the punitive French ex-

ped1t1on dispatohed to avenge the massacre has already been desoribed. 26
In 1867 the United States was placed in a pos1tion
analogous to that ot Franoe the year betore by an incident involving the burning of the schooner General Sherman 1n Korean
waters and the murder of 1ts complement and passengers by
Koreans.

In considering the proper method of obtaining an ex-

planation and satisfaction, the Department of State decided
against the expediency of a punitive expedition to Korea, in
view ot the conspicuous failure of the recent French mission.
Instead, it authorized George F. Seward, American consul-general
at Shanghai, to prooeed to Korea to obtain an official explana-

25

Ibid •• 116-117; Curzon, Problems .2!

~

F"ar East,

201, remarks that Chlna"' s policy of repudiation was d"I'Cta't'idbY

a deslre to escape responsibility for the act as well as the
payment of thelndemnlty which it would ental1. This Is but
another illustration of the misconcept10ns of the relationship
existlng between China and Korea.
26

Supra, 6.,

15
tien and, if possible a treaty of amity and commerce.

However,

discovering in advance the futility of such a mission. this plan
.a8 dropped. 21

In 1871 similar authority was granted to the

United states Minister at Peking, Frederick P. Low.

Taking the

precaution of sollci ting in advance of his departure .fQr Korea
the good will and otfices of the Pekl.ng government, Low received
• reply which ran in part aa followsl
Korea ls regarded as a country subordinate to China,
yet she ls wholly independent in everything that relates to her government, her religion, her prohibitlons, and her laws; in none of these things has China hitherto interfered. 28
The aotual accompllshments of Low's mission were little
greater than those of the Frenoh mission five years earlier.

On

June 1, 1871, while some of the six ships comprising the mission
were explorlng the coastal waters of Korea, they were fired upon
by land batteries and returned fire.

Attempts at peaceable nego-

tiatlon wlth the Koreans were of no avall.

On June 10 an Amerl-

can landlng party went ashore; ln the ensulng engagement some two
hundred and fifty Koreans and three Americana were k1l1ed.

The

American ships then returned to Shangha1. 29

27 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 121, cltlng Fore1gn Relat10ns ~ !h! Onltea-!tates;-Ia'o, 336-339.
---

Americans

1871, 112.

28

~.,

29

For an account of the expedltion see Tyler
Eastern !!!!,~ew York, 1922, 452-453.

~

Dertnett~

p

16
In 1876 the caution and self-restraint of Japanese d1plomacy in Korea was rewarded by the conclusion of the Treaty of
Kang-wha between Japan and Korea, by which Japan hoped to separate Korea from her ·ConfUoian" dependency on China. 30

The open-

ing words of Article I stated that ·Chosen being an independent
state enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan. n31 Also
of significanoe is the fact that the document was dated, not
according to the year of the Chinese reign, as had previously
been the accepted procedure, but rather by the Japanese reign
year, and that of the Li dynasty in Korea.
terms of the treaty,

inte~oourse

Aooording to the

between the two countries was to

be on terms of complete equality; old restriotions on trade at
the port of Fusan were to be removed, and two additional Korean
ports were to be opened to oommeroe.

Furthermore, Japanese sub-

jects were to enjoy extraterritorial prfr vileges. 32

The Japanese-

..
Korean Treaty is notable as being the first unilateral treaty en-

tered into by Korea that was negotiated and framed on the basia

ot Western concepts ot international
for

-

subs~quent

]a w,

and as paving the war

treaties which were to terminate Korea's long-

!h!. l!.£!!.!1. 192.

30

Curzon, .rroblems .2.!

3~

Briti!h and ForeiSD State Papers, LXVII. 530-553.
Is quote~n its en~.

The document

32 Curzon, Problems of the P'ar East, 195, n. 1, remarks
that: "When Japan dictated the-rirst Korean-!reaty in 1876 she
copied the extra-territorial olauses SUlost verbatim from Artiel.
iv. and v. of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of laSS; and has never

17

...
• tanding iaolation and "open- her to tor.mal diplomatio relationa
with the nationa ot the We.t. 33
During the period trom 1878 to 1881 Commodore Shuteldt
of the United Statea BaV7 waa authorized to negotiate on behalf
of the United Statea Government with the government ot Korea tor
purposeaot obtaining reliet tor Amerioan sailors shipwreoked ln
Korean waters, tor opening Korean porta to American trade, and
tor obtaining such extraterrltorial rights aa had been granted
Japan and Qhina. Though repulsed and ignored b7 Korean
Shufeldt tound ln the Chineae Vioer07, Ll

Hung.Chang~

b,

ottloial~

a wlll1ng

and sympathet10 al17 who actlve17 urged on the Korean government
the signature ot tore1gn treatles as the sole .eana ot contlnued
aeourl 'by. 34

AJ,-rl vlng at the reallzation that the torelgner,

onoe hav1ng been allowed to meddle wlth Korea, could never be

p~

manentl7 exoluded trom cloaer relatlon., Chlna undertook to .end
her Korean pollc7 b7 encouraging the varlous powera to enter lnto
direot treaty relations wlth Korea. 3ti

Thls Dew pollc7 was appar-

shown an7 reluotanoe to set ln operatlon agalnst Korea the provialona ot which she complain. 80 bitter17 when applled to heraelt.33 For an account ot the negotlationa attendant on the
completion ot the treat7 see Nelaon, Korea and the Old Orders,
126-134.
.
---

34 T. C. Lln, -Ll Hung-chaD!J Hls Korea Polloles, 18701886,- Chlnes. Sooial aDd Polltical Soience Revle., XIX, 1935-36,
209-12.
36 Curzon. Problema ot the Far Eaat
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ently adopted on the theory that the mutual jealousies and animosities of all the powers would necessarily preclude the ascendancy of anyone until such time as China's military strength
might allow a more active policy.36

It should, however, be not-

ed that Chinafs new policy was not viewed by her

8S

altering in

any way the traditional relationship between the two countries,
but was designed rather to protect that relationship.3'7
The year 1882 witnessed the conclusion of the first
treaty entered into by Korea with a Western natIon, that nation
being the United State..

More significant than the fact that

the treaty opened Korea to American commerce is the fact that
each of the contracting parties agreed therein to render assistance to the other in caae ot necessity.

Article I provided*

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship be.
tween the iresident of the United States and the Kina
of Cholen and the citizens and subjects ot their respective Governmentst
If other Powera deal unjustly or ~ppressively
with either Government the other will exert their
good oftices, on being infonned or the case, to
bring about an amicable ~greemen, thus showing
their frisndly reelings.38 .

3'7 T. F. Tsaing, "Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations,
1870-1894," Chin••• Social ~ Political Science Review, XVII,
1933-1934, 65. ,

3a William M. Malloy, (Ed.), Treaties, Conventiona,
internQtional Acts, Protocols, and Alreemen£s between €he United
~tatea and Oth~owers, i776-l~, aahIngton, D. C.,~lO, I,
~4.33s.-

-

-

.. .

,

..
clause

The second

I
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of the above quoted art1cle was later to be-

come the subject of considerable d1scussion between the United
states and

K~r.ea~

and it was because of this clause that Korea

came to regard the United Sta tea as her "Elder Brother."

The

-Treaty of Peace, Am1ty, Commerce and Navigation between the
United States of America and the Kingdom of Chosen tt was ratified
by the Senate on January 9,

188~,

and proclaimed by President

Arthur on June 4 of the same year.
Onee

~rea

had been penetrated, other nations lost no

time in solicit1ng and obtaining concess1ons similar to those
obtained by Japan and the United States.

Subsequent conventiona

with Japan opened the port of Gensan in 1879, and Chemulpo the
following year; further Trade and Fishery Regulations were concluded between the two countries in 1883.

The Chinese Overland

Trade Regu1at1ons and the American Treaty were signed in 1882.
England and Germany concluded treaties with Korea in 1883, Ruaaia and Italy in 1884, F'rance in 1886. 39
However, this sudden transition from Koreats traditional policy of jealously guarded seclusion to one of almost
unprecedented liberality in her dealinga with foreigners, was
not accomplished without familiar symptoms of domestic unrest.
In 1873, upon the Assumption by the King, L:1. Bsi, (tf full sovereignty, the former Regent beoame head of the Conservative or

-

39

Nelson, Korea

!!!S !h!. ~

Orders, Appendix A, 301-&.
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anti-foreign party.

Opposing all treaties and coneesslons to

foreigners, the Tai-Wen-Kun remained a dominant figure in Korean
politics, chiefly by lnstigating several plots to remove the
foung King and the old Queen Dowager, who had associated herselt
wlth the 11beral and pro-Japanese factlons. 40

One such attempt

in 1882 led to an outbreak in which the Japanese Legation at
seoul was attacked and burned, forcing the Japanese residents to
flee.

Both Japan and Chlna, the latter aoting on her theory ot

Korean dependence, dispatched troops to quell the outbreak.

The

Tai-Wen-Kun, as instigator ot the uprising, was himself kidnapped and deported to China. 4l
During his absence events at the Korean Court precipitated a seoond outbreak, of somewhat similar eharaetel', in 1884.
The Queents party, having become supreme, soon reverted to an
anti-foreign policy_

The so-called Liberal Party, comprising a

few well-intentioned but politically inexperienced Koreans who
believed that Korea was ready for the same volte face made by
Japan ln 1868, seoured momentary control of the government with
Japanese help.

The attempt, however, was rendered abortive by

the arrival of a Chinese force which, after some thirty Japanese

40

------

Curzon, Problems .......
of ......the Far East, 148-149 •
41 For accounts ot the uprising see Grltfls, Corea,
437 ff; also Longford, !!'!!. Ston .2! ~orea, 308 ft.
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bad been kiiled, forced the others to withdraw. 42

Japan prompt-

ly dispatched two diplomatic missions to settle the incident:
one to Seoul under Inouye, the other to Tientsin under Count
Ito.

At Seoul the Japanese demands, including a formal apology,

an indemnity, and the punishment of the guilty, were readily
accepted. 43

The mission to Chtna, resulting in the Convention

of Tientsin of 1885, which provided Russia with a baeia for subsequent intervention in the peninsula, will be disQuesed in the
following ohapter.

42

Longford,!h!

ston .2! Korea, 321-325.

43 Shuahi Hau, China
Xork, 1926, 116-117.

~
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CHAPTER II
EARLY RUSSIAN DESIGNS IN KOREA
Russia, long an interested spectator, appeared for the
first time as an actor on the Korean scene in the early 1860's.
Ever sinoe the Crimean War, whioh had revealed in a most humiliating fashion Russia's all-round weakness when pitted alone
against the West, Russian interest had become more and more fixed
in the East·.

The eminent Russian Governor-General of Siberia,

Count Muraviev-Amurski, taking advantage of' China's preocoupation
in her war with Franoe and Britain, had paved the war for Russian
penetratIon in the direotion of Korea. 1

By the Treaties of Aigun

in 1858 and Peking in 1860 Muraviev had secured Russia's title to
the entire northern bank of the Amur River, as well as the some
six hundred miles of sea coast comprising the Maritime Province,
including the important harbor of Vladivostok.

Thus Russia was

brought into immediate juxtaposition with Korean territory on the
north.

"Never,b observed Lord Curzon, with an irony tempered

with admiration, "was a flne dominion so cheaply or more cleverly

1

Curzon, Problems .2!

l!!! !!.!:!.!.!!, 208, n. 1.
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23

However, neither the Russian government nor Muraviev
himself was thoroughly satisfied.

Even at that early date Rus-

alan diplomats and mllltary leaders In the East had come to the
realization of Russia's absolute need for a port on the Paoific.
Thls need was two-fold:

first,' as a base for naval operations in

eastern waters. second, as a commerclal outlet to southern markets, to enable Russla to compete in Paciflc trade on an equal
tooting with such nations as Japan and Great Britaln.

To be

aure, Vladivostok, founded by auravlev in 1860, was one such port
on the PacIfl0, but Its harbor was frozen atlesst four months ot
the year.

The eastern coast of Korea, on the other hand,

poa~

leased several excellent harbora free from lce all year round.
Especially notable among theae were Fusan on the south east
coast, and aenzan, sltuated on Broughton Bay, half-way between
Pusan and Vladivoatok. 3

Even more deslrable, from the Russian

polnt ot vlew, was Port Lazarev, also on Broughton Bay.

The port

was first surveyed and named by Ruaslans In 1854, and aince that
time had been regarded by them wlth a more than covetous eye.'

2

Ibid •
..........

3 The physical attributes of theae ports are described
by Curson, Problems ~ ~ Far _E.8.S.t, 89-94.

4

Ibid., 92.
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In 1861, pursuant to her need for an ice-free, allyear-round port on the Paclflc, Russla made her flrst attempt to
acqulre such a port ln the vlclnl ty of Korea.,

In August of that

year the Russlan frlgate Possadnlk anchored off the coast of the.
island of Tsush1ma, a Japanese possesslon lylng about thlrty
miles to the south-east of FUsan. 6

The crew dlsembarked, estab-

lished ltself on the lsland, and proceeded to cultlvate the so11
and form a colony under the Russian flag.

The Brltlsh Mlnister

to Japan, Sir Rutherford Alcock, becomlng immediately apprehensive of the Russlan move, dlspatched one of hls asslstants,
Laurence Ollphant, to lnvestigate the matter. 6

The latter repor-

ted to Admiral Slr J. Hope, Commander of the Britlsh Far Eastern
Squadron, who ln turn notlfled the Russlan Admiral that he Intended landlng a party of Britlsh sailors, who would remain on
the lsland as long as did the 'Russians.

This elementary strateg7

proved effectlve. immedlately on receiving the message the Russlans evacuated the ls1and, approxlmately slx months after they
had landed.
To be sure, the circumstances of thls rather short-llved
enterprise are important chlefly as providlng an historlcal pre5 Though at one time belonglng to Korea, Tsushlma waa
ceded, to Japan ln 1615, and consti tuted her nearest outpost to
the Asiatic mainland. Cf. Krausse, lS! l!l!!l1, 7.
6 Curlon, Problems of the F'ar East, 210, n. 1. Ct.
also Ollphant t s own account of~he-rn~e~ A Vislt to Tsuahlma.
:!nl~Ciil~t~ie:g:~i!BaA~g;l!!;8B!· Blackwood's Edlnbu£Sh!!&!- ,
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cedent

fo~

subsequent

tion of Korea.

mo~

determined Russian moves in the direc-

However, in analyzing the situation, the question

quite naturally suggests itself as to why the incident should
have provoked British rather than Japanese action.

The extreme

reluctance of the latter power to undertake an Investlgation
seems to have stemmed from the fact that she was at the tim$ in
mortal fear of becoming embroIled In a war with Russia.

Conse-

quently, she preferred to overlook the occupation rather than, by
oalling attention to it, run the risk of precipitating a conflict.

This is borne out by the fact that, even when the Britlsh

Minister determined to initlate British act1on; Japan declined to
lend any officlal ass1stance. 7

Britain'a 1nterest, on the other

hand, waa d1ctated or waa at least subsequently defended on the
ground that her colonial and commercial interests 1n the Far East
rendered "resistance to such an act a necessary _ asure of selfpreservat10n. "8
After the Tsush1ma episode Russ1a cont1nued to manlrest
an

inte~st

in Korea, though 1n such a way as not to provoke any

serious susp1cions as to her designs.

AQcordingly, she embarked

upon a policy of ass1milat10n, the object of which was to encourage a faml1larity on the part of the Koreans by 1nv1tlng them to
settle In Rua.1an v111ages across the border.

There they served

7 Oliphant "A Visit to Tsushima," Blackwood's EdlnbU~~h Masazine, 136, ~62.
e IbiA. t 768.
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first as squatters and colonists in a virtually uninhabited country, later as farmers, graziers and woodcutters.

There also they

were educated in the principles of the Russian faith so as to become, on their return, the nucleus of a natIve pastorate for the
evangelizatton of Korea.

By 1885 there were an estimated 20,000

Koreans living in Russlan territory, and the number was constantly increasIng. 9

"It was through the agency of these volunteer

Immigrants ana natura11zed citIzens," writes Curson, "that Ru,sla
first opened her campaIgn of politlcal intr1gue 1n the penlnlula."lO

All the whl1e, Ru.slan officers and agents were travel-

ling throughout the peninsula, conducting geographical surveys,
partIcularly of the coast11ne, by way of deter.m1ning the desirability of the various Korean harbors. ll
Tbe year 1885 1s one of signal Importance not only in
the h1story of Korean foreign relations, but 1n the h1story ot
Russian Far Eastern policy as well.

In April of that year diplo-

matic representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Empires, Count
Ito for Japan and Vioeroy Li Hung-Ohang for Ohina, met at Tientsin to negotiate a settlement arising from the Japanese-inspired

9
10

Curzon, Problems
Ib1d.
-Ibid.,

~

lh! l!!!!!!.

209.

11
208-209. Curzon cites as evidence the taot
that up to the-tIme of the Sino-Japanese War the only decent map
of Korea was one that em.nated from RtJ.ss1an souroes.

".-;---------,
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seoul rebellion of the previous year. 12 By the terms of the Con~ention

of Tientsin both parties agreed to withdraw their troop.

from Korea and pledged themselves not to send any military advisers into Korea.

Furthermore. it was agreed that neither party

would send an armed force lnto Korea at any tuturedate without
first notifying the other party' or its intention to do so.

This

important stipulation, contained in the concluding article ot the
Convention, ran as folloW8.

an,.

In case of
disturbance of a grave nature 00curring in Corea which necessitate. the respective
countries or either ot them to send troops to Corea,
it is hereby understood that they shall gtve, each to
the other, previous notice in writing of their intention so to do, and after the matter is settled, they
shall withdr-w their troops and not further station
them the re .13
.
Wlth regard to the Korean Army, the ConventIon provide4<
that.
The aaid respective Powers mutually agree to invl te the King ot Oorea to instruct and drill a sutficient armed force, that she may herself assure her
publio seourity, and to lnvite him to ~ngage into his
service an officer or officers of a third Power, who
shall be intNsted with the instruction of said force. l •
In general. the document may be said to have

represent~d

a slg-

nlficant diplomatic triumph for Japan, for implioit in It was the

12

Supra,

13

Full text in British.!.!!i! F'oreign state iapers,

14

Ibid.

LXXVI, 297-298.

20~21.
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of substantial equality of rights with respect to Korea
Japanese diplomacy had so long been laboring to assert. 15
Japan followed up this diplomatic triumph by embarking upon an
energetic policy of commercial ascendancy in Korea. 16

However,

barring "e:rave disturbances, It Japanese advances in the peninsula
bad to rely thereafter solely on diplomatic and commercial oxped-

lents.
China, on the other hand, pursuing a policy of encouraging the commerclal nations in order to foil those with territorial ambitlons, made every effort to reestab11sh actual control in Korean affairs.

In this she held a distinct advantage

oyer Japan, not alone because of her close connect1on with the
Korean throne, t,he F'oreign Office, and the CUltC:!&3 Service, but,
mOlt important,. through Korea's recognition of her dependent
Itatus. 17
However, it the Tientsin Convention was int6l-preted -at
the time as a

diploma~ic

triumph for Japan, it was even more a

triumph for Russia, inasmuch as it constituted a virtual invitation for her to intervene in Korea.

Pursuant to

+;'1-- ...

m~_l!

tary

clause of the Convention, Korea turned to Russia for m1.1i tary ad-

_

15

Curson, Problems of ................
the ;r'al" .......East, 193.

16

-

Ibid., 194-195.

17 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 172. On Chinese
control of Korean Customs, cr:-Curzon;-Probtems s! ~ ~ !!!1.
178-179.
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visers who, from the very nature ot the situation, were bound to
e:1:cercise considerable influence, not only, in the Korean Army,
but in domestic affairs as well.
In this connection it is important to note the role
played by P. G. von Mo11endort, a former official of the German
Consular Service 1n China, appofnted by Li Hung-Chang early in
1883 to the important posts oftlnspector General of Korean Customs and adviser on economic affairs.

This appointment may be

said to have marked the introduction Of a new element in Chinals
Korean policy--the use of commercial agents as vehicles of control. lS Mollendorf reorganized the Customs Service and was instrumental in introducing several significant
in the eountry.1S

CD

mmeriea1 retorms

Not content .. however, to confine his attention

to internal matters, Mol1endorf concerned himself also with the
foreign policies of his newly-acquired homeland, whicb policies
immediately took an abrupt turn for alliance with

-Russi~.

His

plan had as its purpose to forestall the possibility of any repetition of Japanese intervention in Korea, by inviting Russian
instructors for the Korean Army and conceding to
the Pacifie. 20

IS

~'~sia

a port on

Seizing the opportunity of obtaining for herselt
le1son, Korea !n2. ]h!

lli Orders, 165.

19 Hosea B. Morse, The International Relations of the
Chineae Empire, Lon~on, 1918, lTf, io-ii.
- -

1928,

S.

20
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~
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a port in Korea, Russia in a secret provisional agreement declared her willingness to grant Korea a for.m of protection and to
provide the desired military advisers, in return for a "lease" ot
port Lazarev, on the eastern littoral of Korea near Genzan. 2l
News of the secret Russo-Korean agreement, came to light
hen the Russian agent, Alexis de Speyer, arrived in Korea to
confirmation ot the agreement.

The disclosure imme,diately

ecame a source of embarrassment for all concerned.
dort, whose complicity in the scheme to displace

Von Mollen-

Ch~nese

influ-

ence in Korea and substitute Russian was evidenced by his support
of the Russian envoy, was recalled and summarily dismissed by Li
Hung-Chang.

The King of Korea, having earlier solicited military

advisers from the United states, disclaimed any knowledge of the
agreement and, despite repeated Russian threats, disavowed it
completely.22

The Chinese Viceroy took the lead in frustrating

the Russian attempt, and in so doing further augmented Chinese
power and prestige in the peninsula at the expense ot that of
Russia and Japan. 23

Thus, it became apparent that the Sino-

21 Dennett, "Early American Policy in Korea, 1883- .
1887," Political Science Quarterlr' XXXVIII, 1923, 94. As early
as 1880 RUssIan aftectlon for tor Lazarev was in eVidence, and
i. believed to have further inclined Li Hung-Chang toward the
policy of Korean treaties. Cf. Curzon, Problems of the Far East,
209-210.

-- --- --- ----

22

Dennett, "Early American PolIcy," 95.

23

Tsiang, "Sino-Japanese RAlations," 91.

~~------------~
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Japanese Convention of 18S5 had not resolved, even in the minimum
degree, the Korean question whioh, in time, was to beoome even
more complex. 24
Meanwhile Russo-British antagonism in the !oar East was
beooming inoreasingly eVident, due

~artly

to the disolosure ot

the secret agreement, partly axso as a result of new Russian advances on the Afghan frontier. 2S
hesitation.

Again Britain aoted without

Immediately on reoeiving word of the prospective

Russian occupation of Port Lazarev, the British Navy was instruoted to oocuP1 Port Hamilton, a small island of the Quelpart
group dominating the entrance to the Korean Strait.

Without con-

sulting either the Chinese or the Korean governments, the base
was seized on April 15, 1885.

Though this action on the pa.rt of

the British was an open and flagrant violation of international
law, they remained in oocupation until F'ebrua17 of 1887, at which
time the Chinese government finally succeeded in exacting from
M. Ladygensky, the Russian representative at reking, ha most ex;plioit guarantee" that if the British evacuated Port Hamilton,
"the Russian government would not occuP7 Corean territory under
any circumstances whatsoever. h26 It would appear, however, that

24 Morse, Internat10nal Relat10ns of the Chinese
Empire, III, 6-19. Arso Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchihurl1, 8-9.
25

Langer, D1Rlomacx £! Imper1alism,

26

Letter of Tsungli Yamen to Sir J. Walsham, Pek1ng,
quoted in full by Henry Norman, Peoples and
New York, 1895 270.
-

~,,18B6

.

le~.
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the British were induced to evacuate partly because the admiralt7
had reported unfavorably on the military and defense aspects of
the port. 27 The Russian action, on the other hand, was undertak.en in ore...er to forestall the possib1.1ity of a naval conflict,
unacceptat19 at that

time~

which might very easily develop into

somethlng like a ftsecond Dardanelles."28
British interest in Ko.rea at this particular juncture
in P'ar Eastern international relations can be explained, part17
as dictated by commercial interests and the political necessities
of the time, partly also as arising from contingencies of the
none too certain political future.

British policy recognized

that a Russian port and fleet in Korea would constitute a formidable threat to Brit1sh shipping in eastern waters, let alone convert Russia wi thin the short space of a few years into the greatest naval power in the Pacif1c.

In such an event the balance of

power in the Far East would be ser10usly threatened, if not completely overturned 1n the favor of her chief rival in Aeia.
Furthermore, in the words of Lord Cur,on, "England is prohib1 ted
alike by her imperial objects and her commercial needs frem lending her sanction to any such issue."29

!E& Politics, 369.
Rossila Z Manchzhurii, 8.

27

Norman, Peoples

28

Romanov,

29
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rr---------In the fall of 1880, in the face of rising agitation on
the part of the Western nations and Japan for the neutralization
of Korea, China took further steps to tighten her hold upon
Korea.

Since these nations still persisted in viewing Korea as

sovereign and independent, the Korean King had manifested a growing indifference to the firm observance of the Confucian relationship.3O

Accordingly, Li Hung-Chang dropped his former polic7

of maintaining the status quo by encouraging foreign commercial
interests, and thereafter attempted, insofar as possible, to exclude all traces of foreign influence.

The Tai-Wen-Kun, who' had

formerly been removed because of his extreme pro-Chinese and
anti-foreign sentiments, was returned to Korea. 3l

Chinese con-

trol ln the peninsula was to be further augmented by the installation of a Chinese -Resident" at Seoul.

This important offlce

was entrusted to Yuan Shih-Kai, long familiar with Korean affair
from the time of his appointment as -Director-General Resident
in Korea of DiplomatiC and Commercial Relations," Yuan was in the
position of a virtual mayor of the palace, and it was through hi
that the Chinese F'orelgn Orfice administered its Korean policy. 32
Other key adMinistrative and advisory offices in the Korean Cus-

30

Nelson, Korea !B£

31

On the Tai·Wen-Kun's removal, see !upra, 19.

32
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toms Service and Foreign Office were filled by Li with an eye to
insuring maximum efficiency and loyalty under the revised plan ot
operations. 33
nlough RUssia was in no position to act on her Korean
interests at the moment, this is not to say that she had forsaken her desire for an'ice-free port on the facific.

There hal

been found in the Krasny Archiv a document which records a special secret policy discussion held on May 8, 1888, between Adjutant-General Kort,

Governor-Genera~

of the Amur, ano Zinoviev,

Head of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Offlce.34
In view of the considerable light which this document sheds on
the underlying motives and objectives of Ruslia' s F'ar Eastern
polioy at this time, it might be well to examine it in some de·
tail here.
The actual discussion revolved about the following
three pointsl

first, whether the acquisition of Korea was immed-

iately desirable, and if so what consequences might be expected
from such action.

Second, whether danger in Korea might consti-

tute a threat to Russia.

Third, what measures should be taken to

resist Chinese designs in Korea.
33

As regards the first two points

Nelson, Korea ~ !h! ~ Orders, 179-180.

"First Steps of Russian Imperialism in the Far
East, 1888-1903," (trom 1932, 54-124), Chinese Social and Political Science Review, XVIII, Shanghai, 1934, 231-244. ~trans
34

~atb:rls ,,~~It

~~------------~
the gentlemen were ln substantial agreement that though Korea,
by reason of her extreme weakness, might easlly become a tool of
aspirations inimical to Russia, notably China, the lmmediate acquisition of the peninsula by Russia was nelther feasible nor
partlcularly desirable.

Three reasons were alleged for this:

first, the fact that belng a po'or country, Korea was hardly a
profitable market for Russian goods; second, it was too tar removed from Russian defense centersJ and, third, Russian occupation of Korea would destroy once and for all diplomatic relations
wlth China and, consequently, wlth England as well.
As to the policy to be pursued by Russia, it was agreed
that Chinese control would be definl tely detrimental to Russia.
However, since Japanese policy most closely corresponded to Russla's long-range ambitions, the prime object of Russian policy
shoald be to work with Japan in supporting Aorea against Chinese
pretentions, thereby b·ring1ng a certain "moral pressure" to bear
upon China-.

At the same time it was suggested, however, that "to

encourage the Korean government in development of its military
proportions exceeding the need of malntaining order 1n that country would not be in harmony with our own

Interests~35

In the same year, l8a8, a Commercial Convention was
concluded

\)etw~en

Russia and Aorea, acct:'l"dJ.ng to the terms of

Which the Korean land frontier and a Korean market at the mouth
35

Ibid.
-.

~~.~------------~
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..

of the Tiuman River were to be opened to Russian trade. 36

Some

three years later, in 1891, a Russian packet service between.
Shanghai and Vladivostok, touching the harbors of Fusan and Genzan, was initiated and maintained under a liberal subsidy of the
Imperial Russian Government.
is described by Curzon as

This last seemingly innocuous move

char~cteri8tic

of the

11

energy

with~eh

the Russians 'advance .their flag in Eastern waters, and make an
experime.ntal and even expensive CODl.>nerce subserve 'larEer poll tical ends. tt37
However, during these years, 1888-1891, the Korean situ_tion remained unsettled, with events working,
Ohins·s favor.

g~nerally,

in

The assassination in 1890 of the Korean Queen

Dowager, at the instigation of the recently returned Tai-Wen-Kun,
provided but another in,stance of China t s 18 tent strength in the
peninsula.

The Korean King, according

t~

a time-honored custom,

immediately deputed a mission to report the death to the Emperor,
who in turn dispatched a mission of condolence. 38

This incident

served as a fitting climax to China's continued efforts to secure
recognition of the traditional familial relationship between the
two countries.

Russia, as is eyidenced by the aforementioned

!!.! !!!.! !!.!:!!.!!,

35

Curzon, _P...r.;;o,;;;b...l,;;,em;;;;;.;;.s

37

178,
-Ibid.,
The interesting details of this mission are

38

by Curzon, PrOblems .2!

!h! !!.!:~,

199-201.

212.
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discusslon between Korf and Zlnovlev, was pursulng a dellberatel1
studied policy with respect to Korea, chiefly out ot fear of

be~

coming embrolled in a war with England, whose interests in the
Far East coincided, for the most part, with those of China.
Japan, for her part, was pursuing a policy not tooditferent from that of Russla, !Urtihermore, she was enjoying no particular success in asserting her position in .Korea without the
use ot force which, for the time being at least, was out at the
question because at the governmentts preocoupation with domestic
considerations.

Other Western nations, particularly the United

states, were still occupied with trying to figure out the subtleti6s of Korea's

Conru~ian

relationship to China and, as a conse-

quence, played no aotive role in the situation with regard to
Korea at this time. 39

39 For an excellent disoussion of Amerioa's relations
with Korea in this period, see Nelson, Korea and the ~ Orders,
180-198.

,,---------------------------------------------------------,
CHAPTER III
THE "TRANS-SIBERIAN" RAILWAY
In the 1890's Russian eastward expansion took the for.m
of a oonoerted "push" toward the Pacific.

Aooordingly, her Far

Eastern polioy assumed a muoh broader, more dynamio, aspect than
it had previously.

This fundamental change was in large measure

related to the oonstruotion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, an
undertaking whioh from its inoeption was seen to be pregnant witb
world signifioance. l

Predioated not on the simple extension of

the base of internal railway oommunications, nor solely on the
oommertial advantages of intermittent conneotions of isolated
trade points in Siberia, the railway wss heralded as "one of
those world events whioh usher in a new epooh in the history ot
nations."2

The bold and rapid oonstruction of a railway aoross

1 The term "Trans-Siberian," it should be noted, is
one which exists only in foreign, wh.ioh is to say, non-Russian
historical literature. Though, as will be seen later, there was
no single ·:>rganizational unit oontrolling the line, it wl11, for
the 0..,'-r8.1..1 purposes of this study, be oonsidered as a single
unit.
2

Romonov, Roselya .! ,!_!lcnzhurli,4.

~~------------~
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the tro.en steppe. ot

Sibe~ia

was to unite oentral Russia direot

11 with the Far East by an unbroken ohain, a total distanoe ot
some 6,000 mil.s. 3
The impulse neoessary to the undertaking ot so grandiose and far-reaching a soheme was one ot the ohier results of
the so.called "Westernization" ot Russia. In the l880's-- at
approximately the same tim,e that Japan reversed her two-and-a
halt

oen~ury

poli07 of isolation and made her fatefUl turn to

the West-- Russia, already for some two oenturIe. influenoed by
the We.t, plunged torward In the gigantio task of Westernization
at a tar more rapid pace than' at any time sinoe Peter the Great.
For Russia this Westernization meant two things, primarily. Firs
and foremost, it meant the emanoipation ot the serf. with ohange
both for the preponderantly peasant population and, ooncomitantl
tor the whole sooial and eoonomio struoture. Secondly, It meant
a large-scale importatlon ot oapital and modern technlque trom
the West. This eoonomic Westernization manitested Itselt most
notably in four fields-- tlnanoe and ourrency, torelgn investment In Russian enterprise, taritts, and railways."

All tour

aspects are to be seen In varying degrees ot importance in the
3 In Russian measurement the dlstance was slightly
more than 9,000 vera.ts, the verst belng equlvalent to 0.6629

miles.

"

B. H. Sumner, ! Short Hlstory ot Hussia, Hew York,

1949, 346-351.
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construction of the Trans-Siberian.
Whether regarded from an economic or poll tical point
of view, the urgent need tor an improved system of communication.
in Siberia had been obvious to Russlan authorities for well over
a quarter of a centu17 before the inception of the Trans-Siberial,
although, it must be granted, the stupendous conception ot a
Russian-Pacific railway was not from the beginning grasped in it.
entirety. The outbreak of the Crimean War "in 1853 served to i.press upon authorities the necessity for the construction ot
strategic railways, and it ia generally believed that the dittioulties ot transport, added to those ot maintaining oommunicationa between the ahores ot the Blaok Sea and the administratlve
centers of the count17. were largely responsible tor the course
of eventa whlch ended the campaign.

5

Ever slnce the time of

.Muravlev there had been talk of connectlng Russia t • Slberlan
possessiona wlth Europe by a tranacontlnental ral1road. 6 Maravlev himself became interested in the scheme. advanced by several Engliah and Amerioan concession, hunters. For the moat part,
however, theae schemes were based solely on conjectures, wlthout
any prelimlnary surveys aa to the exact

ne~d8

and tradlng pos8i-

bl1itles of the d18tricts affected. As a consequence, they
5 Alexis Krausse, Ruasla in Aalac A Record and a
Hew York, 1899, 196.
-- ---- --- -

6 Langer, Diplomact 91. Impel'iallem, 171.

Stud~

l
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remained without any immediately praotioable result. 7
During the seventies and eighties some consideration
waS given to the oonstruotion of a Siberian railway, especially
in view of the need of opening up for exploitation the vast
of Sibena.

weal~

However, several factors oombined to obviate the

possibility of any action being-taken at that time, only after
the acute orisis occasioned by the British occuaption of Port
Hkmilton in lS85

the strategic argument advanced with any d.gree of persistence by Russian military men in tne Far East. S
~as

Even then, however, the Minister of Finance, Vishnegradski, per.isted in his plea of lack of fnnds, so that no substantial progres.s was made until news came in lS90 of China's projected Manchurian line.

In th4t year Li Hung-Chang sent an English engin-

eer, C. W. Kinder, to plot a line from the Great Wall at Shant

haikwan northeastward through Manchuria to Mukden, and thence toward the Russian frontier.

Despite the secreoy of Kinder's move-

ments, the Russian intelligence disoovered his intentions, and
bo·th at St. Petersburg and Vladivostok great apprehension was
felt. g , Such a scheme, if realized, constituted a formidable

7 These early schemes for a Russian-Pacifio railway
are reviewed by Henry Norman, Peoples .!.!!!!. roli tics .2! l!'.!!. l!.£
!!!,!, 160-161.

a Langer, Diplomacl

~

Imperia11sm, 171.

9 ~. For a fuller discussion of the projected Manchurian line, see Percy H. Kent, Railwal Enterprise !n China,
London, 1907, 38-41.
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threat to Russia's territories on the Amur and Ussuri.

Finally,

on March 17, 1891, the knot of all the technical and official

CO&

troversies was cut by the Tsar, and the decision was taken to construct the line.
One of the decisive factors in the entire project came
in August, 1892, with the appolntment of Sergel Witte as Minister
of Flnance.

The ablest and most powerful single representative

of the new financial, commercial, and industrial lnterests which
were transforming Russia internally and lending a new cast to
Russian imperialism, Witte was born at Tiflis in 1849, where hi.
father, of Dutch-German extraction, was an imperlal administrator.
Educated at the University of Odelsa, Witte devoted some time to
reactionary journalism in connection with the Slavophils and
M. Katkov, and lubsequently associated himselt wlth railway construction in southern hussla.

Thus, while a staunch apostle ot

Slavophil political conservatism, he become also a staunch advocate of Western

comme~elal

and industrial development.

Witte served for a time as general traffic manager ot
the south-Western Railway, and also as a member ot an imperial
commission appointed to survey railway construction and managemes
throughout the Empire.

Appointed head ot the department of rail-

ways in the Ministry of Finance by Tsar Alexander III, he was

pr~

moted to be Minister of Ways and Communications in 1892, and several months later was appointed to succeed Vishnegradski as Minister of Finance.

The significance of this appointment cannot be

~

" ,
--------------------~----------------------------------------,
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o.erestimated, inasmuch as it constituted an otficial repudiation
of the money-saving policies pursued by Vishnegradski, and further testified to the determination of the Imperial government to
allow no expense to stand in the way of drawing Siberia closer to
itself, aa well aa to remove the railway from the dead issue potnt
at which Vishnegradski had kept it. 10
DurIng

WI~tets

tenure of ottice the FInance Ministry

came to include also.commerce, industry, and labor.

In Far East-

ern attairs it became, tor all practical intents and purposes,
the superIor of the.Forelgn OttIce, and the rival even ot the War
Otfice. 11

As Minister of Finl\nce Witte conceived and put into

practIce the policy which

l~ter

came to be called "conquest by

railways," and which was subsequentlJ to be merged in the Idea ot
"dollar diplomacy.-

Throughout the period trom 1892 to his

e~

clipse and tall trom grace In 1903 Witte's politIcal biographJ i.
the story of the buildIng of the Trans-Siberian to the point
where it became the most important single factor in Russian

ex.

pansion1st policy in the Far East.
A

fI~

believer in the economic as well as the strateglc

value of the Trans-Siberian, Witte, In one of his early reports

10

RomanoT, Rossila

~

Manchzhurii, 55.

11 B. H. Sumner, nTsardom and Imperialism In the Far
East and MIddle East, 1880-1914,- Raleigh Lecture on HIstory,
!roceedings of the British AcademI, XXVII, London, 1941.
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to the Tsar, described the extension of the line across the whole
of Siberia as fla state undertaking in the broadest sense of the
tezm, tt one attended with "the greatest benefits in the field ot
economic, cultural, and political. interests," for European Russia
as well as for Siberia. 12

He added the fact that the line would

establish "an unint,rrupted rail' communication of Europe with the
Pacific and East Asia, thereby opening up a new road and
zons not only for Russia, but for international commerce as well,
and placing it in the rank of "those world events which usher in
a new epoch in the history of nations, and which often bring in
their wake fundamental changes in the established relationships
between states. fl13 Among the economic considerations under which
the plan was formulated must be counted the famine which in 1891
held European Russia in ita grip with unprecedented force, and
the fact that the fulfillment of the undertaking was laid, in the
course of the next few years, upon the broad shoulders of the Ru
lion peasantry,14

The railway meant relief from the famine in

the form of Siberian grain,

+0

the .Russian peasantry it meant an

accelerated road of escape trom hunger and landlessness into a
virtually unpopulated Siberia.
.
12 Romanov, ROISifa v Manchzhurii, 57, Interestingly,
the plan even suggested to ~tti.the possibility of entering into
"more direct relations with the United states," Romanov, 60.
13 .!!?!a., 57.
14

..!2!:!.,

4·5.
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strategically, the Trans-Siberian was of the utmost immediate consequence. 1S

It was ,this aspect which Witte emphasized

when he wrote that "The ra11way will secure for the Russian NaVJ
all the necessary prerequisites and will provide it with a firm
base of support in our eastern ports •••• The Navy can be strengthened considerably •••• ln·the event of political complications in
Europe or the Asiatic East ••• it will control all international
shipping in Pacific waters~"16

The slogan "Dominat1on over all

international commerce in the Pacif1c," proclaimed by Witte in
1892, containid in itself a program which fUrther impelled the

Russian government ultimately to carry the Siberian line acroes

.

the whole of Manchnria as .e1l. 17

These eeonomic and strategic

arguments provide a olear insight into the essentially realistic
motives entertained by Witte in connection with the railway.
That there was, however, also something ot the idealist aDd

impe~

ialist in Witte's make-up is revealed in a letter addressed to
Tsar Nicholas lIon the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, atter hie
own personal 1nfluenoe had been eclipsed and his po11cy of ftpeac
penetrat10n" thrown to the winds.

"We shall prooeed southward,·

Witte then wrote,
along the road of history .... The more ineJ1t countries
in Asia will fall prey to the po~ertul invaders and

2!

15

Langer, DiplgmacI

16

Romanov, Roseila.! Manchzhurii, 60.

17

Ibiq.., 6.

Imperialis~,

171

l

rr_____

- - . C # .,

I

46

will be divided up between them •••• 'l'he problem of each
country concerned is to obtain as large a share as poss1ble of the inheritance of the out11ved Ch1nese Colossus. Russ1a, both geograph1call,. and historically, has
the undisputed r1ght to the l1on's share of the expected prey •••• The absorpt1on by RuBs1a of a considerabi.
port1on of the Chinese Empire 1s only a question ot
time •••• 18
To promote construct1on of the line the Siberian

~uil~

way Committee was organized, wh1ch exercised both administrative
and leg1s1at1ve authoritl 1n all matters involve1 in planning and
construction.

At W1tte's instance the young Tsarevitch, Nicholas

soon to become Tsar Nicholas II, was appointed to head the Oommittee, and reportedly took a great personal 1nterest 1n the matter, the task affording htm, a8 Witte put it, "something in the
nature of a preparatory school of statesmanship.R1S

As to the

financing of the project, Witte was in a posit1on to take full
advantage of the recently concluded'Franco-Russian Alliance to
so11c1t loans from the French government, which, 1n effect, el1mlnated every flnancial r1sk earlier connected with the undertak1ng. 20
As orig1U311y planned, the line was div1ded into sevea
sectlons, correspondinp roughly to natural div1sions, each wlth

18 Serge1 Wltte, Memo1rs, translated and ed1ted bJ
A. Yarmolinsky, ~ew York, 1921, 122. Cf. alBo Romanov, Rosaila
! Manchzhurii, 80.
19

Ibid., 63.

20

Romanov, ROfsila

~ Manchzhuri~,

56.

l
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1ts own organizational unlt. 21

Construction of the ral1way began

simultaneously at both ends of the 11ne.

General lnterest in

Russla's Paclflc lands was greatly stimulated by the publiclty
rtt~~19n+;

I3n the much-advertlsed vlslt of the Tsarevltch to

Vladivostok ln May, 1891, when work was commenced on the eastern
part of the 11ne.

Throughout the nlnetles there was wldespread

approval of the ldea of Russla's "great, hlstorical mlsslon" 1n
the East. and Russlan opinion of almost all shades, except the
extreme left, backed Witte's pollcy of Far Eastern expansion. 22
In the non-Russian world, however, the order to

commen~

construction of the Trans-Siberian was regarded as a portentous
departure ln F'ar EasteI'D policy.

The extension of the line was

to take lt, theoretically at least, to Vladivostok, at the AAstern extremlty of Russian possessions in Asia.

However, even be-

fore the outbreak of the Slno-Japanese war, it became perfectly
clear to many well-informed observers in the Ii'ar East that Russia
had no intention of allowing so important a venture to terminate
ln a harbor which, like Vladivostok, was frozen for at least a
third of each year.

Writing in 1895 the publiclst

inquired somewhat incredulously.

Ben~"

Norman

"Can anybody belleve for a mom-

ent that Russia will build the longest ral1way in the world,
21 Krausse, Russia 1n Asia, 208
Peoples !.9.9. Politlcs, 162..!63.-22

!!_ J cf. also Norman,

Sumner, "Tsardom and Imperiallsm," iroceedlngs

!h! Britlsh Adademy, XXVII, 38.

~
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stretching five thousand miles from the furthest edge of her
European possessions, and will spend upwards of forty millions
sterling upon it, for it to end in a harbour that is frozen solid
during five months of the year?"23
was no.

The answer, quite obviously,

Thus, it became perfectly logical to assume that Russia

still entertained designs on an 'io.e-free port in Korea, both Gen ...
zan and

~ort

-

Lazarev on Broughton Bay being considered ideal

~

mini for the railway.
Both Japan and China viewed with a. sense of apprehenskm

the progress of the Russian plan.

It was in Japan and Korea,

however, that the initial repercussions of the railway venture
were felt.

In Tokyo it was feared that onee Russia completed her

system of communications it would thenceforth be impossible to
resist her advances in the Far East with anything approaching
even chances of suocess.

At the same time, the independenoe 01'

Korea or the maintenance theren61" a fully independent "buffer"
were viewed as necessary to the continued security of the Empire~
Consequently, in 1893 Japan, under pressure of the radical and
militaristic elements at home, tried to reas.ert her former aggressive policy with regard to Korea.

In the same year an acute

crisis developed between Japan and Korea, growing out of an embargo placed by"the latter government on the export of beans.
23

Peoples

24

Langer, Diplomacy

~

Politics, 165.
~

Imperialism, 172.
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The affair was settled, but only after Count Ito had appealed to
L1 Hung-Chang to request Korea to satisfy the Japanese claim. 25
For the time being at least Japan seemed Ciuite willing to recogl'- ,;
nize China's claims in Korea as an expedient intorestalling
hussia's designs, apparently on the theory that if matters came
to a war between Japan and China', the former could then occupy
Korea without fear of

prof:;(~'3t

trom the Western powers. 26

:aence,

there can be little doubt that the fear of Hussia's establishing
herself in Korea had much to do with hastening the outbreak ot

..

war over the Korean question.
It will be recalled that, according to the terms ot
the Tientsin Convention of 1885, both parties, Japan and China,
agreed not to send troops into Korea except in case of a "grave
disturbance," and then only arter giving previous notice in writing of their intention to do

80. 2 '7

Such a d.1sturbance presented

itself in 1893 with the emergence in Korea of a party calling itself the "Tong-Hak," or Oriental Learning Society.

Founded in

1859 as a purely religious sect, by the 1890 t s the party had

assumed a political character which was compounded largely ot
anti-foreign, anti-Obri.tian, and anti-Japanese elements. 2a
25
28

Nelson, Korea ~
Ibid., 206~20e.

-Supra,

lh!

~

Be.

Orders, 205.

27 •
28 For a brie f discusslon of the TOllg-Hak in its earl,.
religious phase, see Yo~hill Kang, N!onghak, Encyclopedia ~
pn;.s., Chicago, 1948, XXII, 279.
27
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straint gave way to violence as the Tong-Hak sought to obtain
redress for the execution of its founder, Choi Jaiwoo, as a heretic, and also to secure offioial reoognition of its existenoe.
In 1893 ita leaders petit10ned the king to prohibit all foreign
religions and exclude foreign Merohants--ln other words, to abrogate the Foreign Treatles--threatening rebellion if the government failed to comply with its demands.

Rebellion was not long

in coming; originat1ng 1n the southern provinces, it had attained
before long such menacing proportions that the Korean King found
it necessary to apply to China for military assistance in sup·
pressing the peril.
There is some evidenoe to support the theory, held by
some authors, that

~apan

encouraged, albeit indirectly, the Tong-

Haksl likewise, evidence is to be found in favor of the suggestion of other authors that the Tai-Wen-Kun may have been using
the movement as an in$trument to secure his return to power. 29
In any event, the uprising clearly worked to Japan's advantage,
inasmuch as it afforded her a unique opportunity for direct intervention in the peninsula, where Dsuperior force could aohieve
what had baffled diplomacy.u30

Fully awareof the consequences of

direct aotion, China at first rendered all assi.tance possible

29 "Russian Doouments Relating to the Slno-JapaDese
War, 1894-1895,· Chinese Social and Political Scienoe Review,
XVII, (1933-1934), i§6.!1!, pals1m:
30

Nelson, Korea ~ !h!. ,2!g, Orders, 206.
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short of aotually sending troops to the trouble area.

When the

Korean government failed to quell the outbreak, however, Li HungChang, on June 6, 1894, dispatched 1,500 troops from Tientsin,
with 725 more to follow.

Pursuant to the terms of the Tientsin

Convention, Li "formally assured the ~ap8nes. government that
these troops shall be withdrawn' immediately upon the cessation ot
hostilities.- 51

Similar assurances were made to the Russian min-

ister at Peking. 52

G,ulte significantlr, the Chinese note to the

Tokyo government made use of the term "our tributary state a wlth
reference to Korea. 55
" the Chinese note of June 6, the Japanese
In reply to
government countered with the statement that "the Imperial Gove
ment has never recognized Korea as a tributary stete of China,"
and added that Japan l1kewise would send troops into Korea to p
tect her interests there. 54
which in a short time

Acoordingly, she dispatched a force

nUlllb~red

some 4,500 men.

In the series ot

diplomatic notes which followed each side attempted to justify
the course of action upon which it had embarked.

China 1nsiated,

in efrect. that she was merely following the traditional practice
31 Letter of Charles Denby, Jr., Amerioan Charg,t!, at
Peking, to Secretary of State Ore.ham. June 9, 1894, cited br
Morse, International Relations ~ ~ Cblne~! Em~ire, III, 21.

52
33

54

-

Ibid.

Rsu, China

-Ibid.

~

!!!

Political Ent1ty, 151-152.
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of proteoting her "tributary states," wh1le Japan, repudiat1ng
Korea's tributary status, cited the Japanese-Korean Agreement ot
1882, conferring upon Japan the right to maintain a legatIon guam

in

Korea.~5

Both countries kept pour1ng troops into Korea.

In

the meantime, however, the insurgents, learning of the arrival ot
the Chinese troops, had dispersed, thereby obviatIng the necesa1_
for any outside interference.
A new problem presented itself in the evacuation of top
eign troops from Korean soil.

By the end of June, 1894, there

were slightly more than 3,000 Chinese and, 1n all, some 18,000
Japanese troops in the Peninsula. 38

On June 24, at the inv1tation

of the Korean King, the Western powers.-the UnIted States, RussIa;
France, and England--submitted a Joint note to China and Japan
suggesting a s1multaneous withdrawal ot troops.
its willingness to withdra~, but

u apan,

Ch1na expressed

embarking upon a new tao~

refUsed to do eo until certain internal reforms had been arranged
for. 37

The Peking government, again citing its traditional prac-

tice, flatlyretused to 1nterfere in strictly Korean concerns,
and suggested rather pointedly that 1f Japan regarded Korea as an
independent nat1on, she had no r1ght to inte.rofere e1ther. 38
35 Payson J. Treat, D1~lomatic Relations Between the
United States and JaRan, 185~leg , Stanroi'dl.. IgSt!, ttl 44S.---..t'h.
~lspatcfies are-cIt3d 6y Nor.man;-p6oples ~ pol1t1cs, ~62.
36

37
38

Morse, Internation~l ~elat1on8, III, 22.
Hau, China ~ ~ Political Ent1tl, 154.
Morse, Iat,lQltlQQal B,laM*9DI, 22.
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At this point Japan decided to go on alon..
1

~atio

means, the

~apanese,

Dispensing with dip.

on the morning of July 23, took pos-

session or the royal palace and made a prisoner of the king,
appointing the octogenarian Tai-Wen-Kun

as

regent over the king.3

On August 1, both China and Japan issued formal declarations ot
war, and on August 16, the now Japanese-dominated Korean govern ..
ment announced the abrogation of all treaties and agreements bin
ing Korea to China.
Before actually putting to the test the talents newly
acquired as a result of her assimilation of Western influenoe,
Japan had first taken the precaution of sounding out the attitude
of the two foreign powers most directly coneerned--notablf, Great
Britain and Russia.

1be British, long-standing allies of China

and the beneficiaries of a considerable trading interest in the
F'ar East, were particularly anxious to preserve the status guo,40
Consequently, Britain declared categorloally that she would deprecate any outbreak of hostilities and, specifically, that she
refused to countenance the anneX9.tion of any Korean terri tory b7
Japan.

This was acconlpanled by a

W

J"J'ling to the effect that anl"

untoward action on the part.of ~apan would lead almost Inevitabl

39
40

23-24.
-Ibid.,
In 1894 Britain controlled 69 per cent of Chinese

trade, and tully 83 per cent of all imports and exports were
carried in British ships. Cr. Curzon, Problems of the Far East,

281, n •. l.
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I

to Russian ifttervention. 41

Before the war had run its course,

however, Brit1sh Far Eastern policy, largely under the pressure
of pub11c'op1nion at home, wae destined to undergo a complete
transformation, the consequences of which will be set forth 1n
the following chapter.
Russia, for her part, stood behind China throughout th
entire dispute, though for different reasons.

Fully cognizant

that Japanese occupation of Korea would render illusory all her
hopes of obtaining an ice-tree port in the pen1nsula, Russia pro
ceeded on the theory that her interests would be better served
should Korea remain under the tutelage of a weak China rather
than of an aggressive Japan. 42
hosti11~ies,

Shortly atter the outbreak ot

on August 21, lSg4, a special Comm1ttee, compr1sing

the heads of the various military, naval,.and administrative departments, was convoked to consider the problems arising from the
war and to arrive at a statement of the policy to be pursued by
Russia. 43 The conclUsions adopted by the Oommittee after its
~

41 A. M. Pooley, ed., The Secret Memoirs of Count
Tadasu Hayashi, Hew York, 1915, 4!=i6. HayasS! was the Japanese
Ambassador to the Court of St. James in the important years preeeeding the outbreak ot the RuBso-Japanese War.
42

Witte, Memoirs, S3.

43 Present at this meeting were. Minister of Foreign
Affairs, M. N. Giers, War Min1ster VannovakYJ Acting Minister".ot
lavy, N. ChikhacheftJ Finance Min1ster Witte, Vice-Minister ot
Foreign Affairs, N. Shishk1nJ Director of the Asiatic Department
in the Foreign Ottice, Count Kapnist.
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disoussion were substantial17 as tollowsl
(1) An7 aotive interterence ot Russia in Sino-Japanese
War being admitted as unsuitable to our interests, the
Committee agrees that in Korean question we must oontinue to follow a pollo7 compatible wlth the other Interested powers and must use our utmost efforts in order
to Inollne the belllgerents to the earliest cessation ot
war operations and to a settlementor.Korean question
through diplomatio ohannela.•
(2) The Committee deoide. to abstain rrom maklng a
special declaration ot neutrallt7, to contlnue to Inspire the Japanese and Chinese governments respect of
our interests and especial17 to oalltheir attention
to the necessit7 of avoidlng everything whlch might
give pretext for misunderstandlngs on our Korean trontier.
(3) To consider desirable as an 1.sue ot the SinoJapanese War the preservation ot the statu. guo In
Korea •••• 44

However, in antlclpatlon of an7 unforseen developments whloh
mlght affect Russla's position, the Commlttee oharged War Miniater Vannovsk7 to "come to an agreement wlth the Minister ot Pinance as to openlng the needed oredlts when necessary," to reinforce the troops alread7 statloned on the Korean trontler. 4S
The posslblllt7 ot
turbed Japan.

~ls.lan

Interventlon great17 dis-

Nevertheless, desplte the

un~avorable

diplomatio

auspices, Japants splrited forelgn po1lo7 was opportune In vie..

-

of the situatlon at home and abroad, partloularl7 In China, whe
44 "First Steps of Russian Imperiallsm In the Far
East," Chlnese Soolal ~ Polltloal Solenoe Revlew, XVIII, 251.
45

-

Ibid.
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• oloser raPRrochement with Russia was at that time being
ed. 4S

effeot~

It fUrther bears wltness to the fact that Japanese diplo-

macy had kept pace wlth her rapld material development.

However,

the contention of some authors that ~apan, ln taking the lnitiatlve, was merely forestalling a slmilar course of action on the
part of Chlna, seems untenable."

In her effort to anticipate

.

Russia, whose position ln the F'ar East would be supreme: ..i th "the
completion of the Trans-Slberian, Japan merely forced a convenient issue wlth Chlna, and beoause she was prepared, whereas
China had only talked preparation, she won.
Seoret Memolrs ot Count Tadaau Hazashi, 42.

46

~

47

This theais is advanced, though not substantlated,

by A. M. Pooley 1n h1s preface to Hayashi's Secret Memoirs, 42.

~---------,
GHAPTER IV
THE TRIPLE llTERVENTIOJ
The military phase of the Sino-Japanese oampaign need
not ooncern us here. 1 It is quite sufficient, for the purpose
of this study, to observe that during the course of the war the
Japanese destroyed or oaptured the greater part of the Chine ••
navy, drove the Chinese forces out ot Korea, occupied southern
Manchuria as far west as the Liao Riyer, and invaded Shantung.
The campaign revealed, much to the 'surprise of all concerned,
the complete tmpotence of China to put any effect1ve mi11tary
s1stance even in the immediate proximity of tts own cap1tal,
on the other hand, the indubitable milttary preparedness ot
Jap~n.

Outwardly; the war tied an lnternatlonal "Gordian knot·

whlch, according to the Russian historian Romanov, ·was cut,
though not untied, ten years later by the treaty of Portsmouth."
I.

Fi~lly,

it revealed unm1stakably .the fact that Japan already en

1 A generally excellent treatment of the military
phase is to be found in "Vladimir," ~ China-iapan !!£, London,

1898.

2

Roasiza

~

Manchshurii, 10.
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tertained ver" proud and tar-reaohlng ambitions, the essenoe ot
whlch reduced to the tollowing.

(1) the establlshment ot a pro-

tertorate over Korea, (2) the establishment of a militarr base
close to the shores of the MIddle Klngdom, and,

(~)

the

ooou~n

of Manchuria, including the Llaotung ieninau).a.
Japan's vlotorr over the "ramshaokl. Emplre" had oatenslbly been complete, and Chlna was compelled to sue tor peace,
formal negotiations for whieh were lnitiated.at Sh1monosekl in
Maroh, 1895. 3 Boweve~, Japants success brought her up at once
against the Western Powers, allot whom, having failed to foresee the outcome of the war, were deeply concerned with the sudden
upset ot

~he

atatus

g,u~

in the liar East.

It was perfeotly clear

that they oould not be expeoted to ma1ntain an indlfterent att1tude to the terms imposed by Japan, whlch tound herself in the
rather paradoxloal posltlon of not belng able to imitate the
Western natlons wlthoutchallenglng them.
At this junoture ln Far Eastern relatlons, Russia was
having conslderable diffioulty in fixing upon a defInite oourse
ot aotion.

The questlon now was whether it was advisable for her

to- oontinue to aot conjointly wi th the other interested powers,
--,---",~"

q

3 Several earlier attempts on the part of Chlna to
effeot a settlement.-one in November, the second in Deoember-were rejected by Japan on the grounds that the Chinese ambassadors did not possess full diplomatic powers. Cf. Morse, International Relations, III, 37-43, also Treat, Diplomatic Relaiions,

!!, 801-512.
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or to take independent action.

Ber position was rendered partic-

ularly uncertain by the faot that the exact nature ot the Japanese demands could not be aseertalned, despite Japan's aSluranee.
that she had no intention of encroaching upon the lndependence ot
Korea."

For this reason, any discussion of the pos8ibility ot

guarantees for Russia against the further strengthening of

Japan~

position was bound to assume a highly conjectural, not to mention
eontroyersial, charaeter.
The entire question of Russia's policy was submitted to
a meeting of the Special Oommittee held on February 1, 1895, and

.

presided over by the Grand Duke Alexis.'

Throughout the course

of the discussion, a marked divergence of opinion obtained, particularly among the representatives of the Foreign Office and the
military •.. The Foreign Minister suggested that Russia might ocouR
the island of Kargodo (Koje-do), on the southeastern littoral ot
Korea at the entranee to Broughton Strait.

ThlS

sugg&8tion met

with a sharp objection on the part of the Chief ot the General
Staff on the ground that the island was too remote to serve any
effective miliiial'7 purpose.

The Navy Department favered occupa-

tion of some "part of Manchuria,· to counterbalance Japan's occu4

Romanov f Ros8ila.I Man'ehzhuri!, 67.

5 The membership of the Committee, with the exception
of AleXis, was substantially the same as that of the m~eting ot
Augu~t 21, 1894.
Cf. supra, 54, n. 43, The minutes of the meet ...
ing are quoted in full ~n £he Chinese Soclal ~ Political Seie~
Re.le~, XVIII, 251-260.
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pation ot Port Arthur and Weiha1we1, but th1s was rejected as
111-advised until such time as the Trans-Siber1an should be completed.

W1tte maintained that, tor the t1me being at least, it

would be advisable to do nothing beyond augmenting

Rus~la'.

naval

forces in Far Eastern watere eo as to be able "at any time to
meet all kinds of eventualities. ue

This opinion was concurred in

by Minister of War Vannovsk7 and Count Kapnist, Director of the
Asiatic Department, and was one ot the conclusions adopted by the
Commi ttee in 1 ts report to Tsar Nicholas' 11.7

The chlet polnt ot

Ru.ssian pollc7, 1 t was generally agreed, must be to lnsll!rt on the
preservatlon of Korean independence.

For the rest, lt was deter-

mined to reach an agreement wlth England and France for "collective pressure" upon Japan, contingent upon the gravity of her
demands. B To Witte thls last point was of prlme importance, becau.e only in this wa7 could Russia secure the time necessary to
complete the Trana-Slberlan--"when we shall be able to step forward in full possession of our materlal means. uS

255.

6 Chinese Social

!!S

Political Science Review, XVIII,

7 It should be noted that Alexander III died on November 1, 1894, and was succeeded by hls eldest son, the Tsarevitch
Nlchola.. Though Nicholas assumed the responsibilities ot oftice
immediately on nis tather's death .. the actual coronation ceremonies were deferred until the spring of 1896.
S

-

Ibid., 259-260.
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The dilemna with which the Russians found themselves
confronted at this time was characterized in an extremely penetrating dispa tah of the Amerioan Minister at St. Petttrsburg,
Mr. Breckinridge, to Secretary of State Gresham, dated FebNar7
lS8
••• T conclude that what Russia most needs and wants at
this time is outlets upon the Pacific Ooean. She would
be glad to have with this a considerable population to
help make her railroad pay expenses. Mongolia is a desert fit only to sustain cross tie. or to act as a frontier. Manchuria is thinly populated and. too far North
to alone fully answer her purpoles. Corea and the country,about Pekin, one or both, coupled with the other,
more nearly meet her requirements.

Thia war haa come too early for Rulsia. Her Siberian road is not completed, and the great increase
of her navy ia not finished. Both continue to be rapidly pushed, but some years are required for their
completion •••• ln a few years she could pick a quarrel
with China and take what she wanted ••••
I take 1 t, then, that Russia is in a state of extreme embarrassment. She may not offioially reveal her
fUll desires unless favored by circumstances in'the
course of the negotiations for peaoe. But if she can'"
not now get what I am sure she wants, she will at least
leave nothing undone to prevent Japan from gaining a
foothold upon the con'tinent, and t(\ prevent anything
like a protectorate over Corea •••• Having formed fairly
confident opinions of the wishes of Russia, I will add
that her diplomaoy may, in view of the complications ot
the situation, abound in surprises. 10
This analysis of the situation proved quite correct and, with the
development of the peace negotiations at Shimonoseki,' took on an
added note of prophecy.

10 Breckinr1dge to Gresham, cited by Treat, DiRlomatl0
BllltlQP" II, 532-5&3.
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the proposed entente between England, li'rance,

and Rulsia, there was no apparent reason, in the days before
Sht.onoseki, why it should not come oft as originally planned.
In the early oonversations held between the three powers in February and March of 1895, it was found that a community of interest existed, and it was presumed t?at concerted action would fol10w. 11

From the very outbreak of the war, England had declared

herself as unalterably opposed to any infringement of Korean independence and the annexat10n of Korean terri t,l')" by Japan.12
Howeve~,

she was somewhat hesitant about lending her sanction to

any interventlonary measurea until ,the commerc1al clauses ot the

Japanese terms should be known.

Although all sources are strang.

1,. s1lent on this matter, there can be l1ttl'$'doubt that England'.

SUbsequent pollcy of non-intervention was due in large measure
to the fact that Br1tish interests were benettted by the oommerclal and 1ndustrlal concessions exacted by Japan hom Chlna. 13
Also of 1mportance, though cons1derably more dlff1cul t of evaluation, 1s the tact that public opinion 1n England, part1cularly
as reflected 1n the press, seems to have been sent1mentally influenced b7 the ev1dence ot Japanese "progress U afforded by the

11 Langer, Dil10mac~ of Im~erlal1sm, 176, citing Baroa
A. Me7endortt. corres~on .nee ~li!oma lque
M. de Stall. Paris,
1929, II, 259-2B4. S art was €be RUssIan AmSaasa~r In tondon at
that time.

a.

12

Supra, 53.

13

Langer, ..'alAIIIAJ' At tRIpod ,1 i 11'. 186.

,

1
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outcome ot the war. 14
In the meantime, however, the peaoe negotiations at
shimonaseki were proceeding rather tenuously, and no amount ot
inquiry -or deliberation on the part of the interested powers
could throw much light on the Japanese conditions. 1S

The progrea.

of the deliberations was retardea somewhat as a result of an
attempt by a Japanese fanatic to assaSSinate the Chinese Aubasca.
dor, Li Hung-Chang.

Though the wOUJI.d sustained by Li did not

prove tatal, the attempt on his life altered appreciably the
course of the subsequent negotiatiors{

In recognition of the fl.

grant and unprovoked nature of theasaault, the Japanese govern...
ment felt constrained to otfer'China an unconditional armistice,
and the severity of its terms was mitigated considerably.

Thus"

according to Morse, the incident "benetited China more than a
victory in the field."lG

Nevertheless, in view ot the desperate

straits to which China was reduced by the war, the Japanese,terms
were still more severe than she could hope to meet.
With tbe exception ot England, which positively re~sed

to intervene, the position of the powers remained indefinite
14

Da1lin, Rise

!!

Ruasi~

in Asia, 38.

~5
Only on April 1 waa the first draft of the conditions presented to the Ohinese delegation. Ct. Paul H. Clyde,
I!temational Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922, Columbus, Ohio,

I

~I,

21.

--

16 international Relationa, III, 45.
place on Marc 24.

The asaault took

r=

.Uk·
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At the same time, however, it was becoming increasingly evident
tbat to procrastinate further was also to run the risk ot losing
altogether the opportunity to intervene.

It was to this extreme-

ll,ceri tical state of affairs that Prince Alexis Lobanoy-Rostovskl
addre.sed himself immediately upon hi' appointment to succeed
Giers as Minister of Foreign
me~t

Aff~irs.l7

Prior to this appoint-

LObanov had occupied for some sixteen years the poet of Am-

bassador in Vianna, the same capacity in which he had also served
in London and Constantinople.

According to Witte, LobanoY, at

the time of his apPOintment, was utterly ignorant of the Far
East,18

This statement must be Interpreted; however, in the

light of the fact that Lobanov entertained views radica1ll
ent trom those of the Finance Minister.

His observations

diffe~
conce~

ing the situation that had developed in the Far East Lobanov set
forth at length in two memoranda to the Tsar, dated April 16,
1895. 19
17 Giers had died on January 26, 1895, Lobanovts ap.
pointment was confirmed by Micholas on March 6 of that lear.
1S Memoirs, 82. According to his own statement, Witte
was the only one Nilf conversant wi th the l"ar East. Langer,,!2!210macI of ImRerialism, 180 puts this down as "just one of the
many exaggeratIons in Wittefs vainglorious account of his own ca- ,
rear." Strange1f enough, Baron Romen Rosen in his FortI Years i!
Di~lomacI' New York, II, 134-137, confirms Witte'. estImat. of
to anov.
19 Both of these dispatches are quoted in -First Steps
ot Russian Imperialism in the Far East," Chinese Soc1a1 and Poli11cal Science Raviaw,XVIII, 260-263.
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In the first of these memoranda Lobanov characterized
as extremely undesirable "from the pOint of view of our interestsany occupation by Japan "of the peninsula where Port Arthur is
situated. n

There was no doubt in h1s mind that Russia should

test such a move.

p~

The question presented itself, however, as to

whether she should carry th1s protest so far as to "have recourse
to measures of foreeft--and 1n such an event could she count on
the support of the other powers'

The British Ambassador, he con-

tinued, had informed him that though the British government
Russia's concern over Port Arthur, it would

"!g!ll

sh~~

probabl1itl ••

use neither measures of force nor demonstrations, because lately
publlc opinion in England was more than inclining to the slde ot
the Japanese. H20

FUrthermore, in view ot the ill-defined polic-

ies of France and Germany, there was no telling how far they
•

would be willing to support a

~us8ian

protest.

Onder such cir-

cumstances, Russia could do little more than "to indicate to the
Japanese government in the most friendly manner that the taking
possession of Port Arthur would become an everlasting impediment
to the restoration of friendly relations with Ch1na, and serve as
a pretext for the disburbance of peace 1n the Far East. ft21 But
preliminarr to any such action, advised Lobanov, Russia should

250.

20

Chinese Soclal

21

~.,

261.

~

Po11tical $oience Review, XVIII,

r
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t1rst make certain that the otner powers would join her in suoh
an expression.
In his second report at April 6, Lobanov stressed the
broader aspeets of the problem:

notably, the choice between

China and Japan as a "future ally" of Russia.

"It our present

posi tion in the Far East satisfl'es us and we intend only to
strengthen it," Lobanov reasoned, Russia could find no better a117
than a hopelessly defeated China.

On the other hand, if Russla

intended actively to seek sa,tlstaetion at her "essential requirements" in the East--the acquisi tion at an ice .. tree port on the
Pacifio, and the annexation of a part of Manchuria necessary tor
a more convenient routing of the Trans ... Siberian.... then she would
almest inevitably have to turn to Japan.

In the tirst place,

China, after the loss of Korea, possessed no such ,ort whieh
oou'.d be given to Russia and, sdcondly, she could not reasonably
be expected to cede a part ot Manchuria.

Thus, h£ concluded,

China could hardly be regarded "as an active and useful ally."
Japan, however, was quite another story.

She would prove

.m1nen~

1,. "usetul" to Russia as a check upon England.... "our principal and
most dangerous edversary in Asia."

An agreement with Japan ap-

peared to Lobanov quite conceivable, and lh 11e he did not definitely express himself in favor of this alternative, he did propose "carefully to abstain from any hostility, apart trom the otb
er powers, ln order not to affect future good relations with the

67

Japanese government. n22
F~m

the foregolng it ls quite evldent that Lobanov

was pushing the Tsar, unconsclously perhaps, into the arms at
Japan.

Blcholas, ln turn, waa apparently dlsposed to accept Lob-

anov's analysls ot the sltuation and, according to Homanov, readily agreed not to demand the retrocession of Port Arthur. 2Z At
the S8me tlme, however, Nlcholas himself raised the question as
to whether, by way of compensating hereelf, Ruseia should not
occupy Port Lazarev or some other port on the east coast of Kore.
Thereby, in the terminology of the January 20 conference of ministers, he laid the basis for an "independent course of action."
In a marglnal note to Lobanov' a second memorandum the Tsar expressed hlmself categorlcally ln favor of such action:

"Rusaia

absolutelI needs !. Rort f~e (.trom leeJ ~ open !!! lear £Oi.tnd.

1h!!. ;eort .!e.!! .2! 1008 te4 ~ .!!l! me inland (tOuth-.!!.!!.2.!' Korea)
!!£ oertalnll, connected ~ ~ possessions £z !. strip ot
~."24

These two memoranda of Lobanov, together with his own

thoughts on the subject, the Tsar arranged to submit to another
meetlng of the Special Committee.
However, when the Committee convened five days later-on April 11--lt did so under sharply modified circumstances.
22

~.,

23

Ho.sila.! Manchzhurii, 70.

24

~.,

263.

71.

The italics are Romanov's.
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the meantime, as Lobanov informed the assembled ministers, word
had been reolved from the Russlan representatlve at Berlln to
the effect that Germany had deolared her readlness "to partlclpate in every step whlch we mlght deem necessary to take in Tokyo
with the vlew of compelllng Japan to forego not only the oocupation of South Manohuria, including Port Arthur, but also the
oupation of the Pescadores Islands."25

00-

France, 11kewlse, had

agreed "to coordinate her pollcy with ours."26

Thls sudden chang4

In the attitude ot the German government was explained as having
been dictated by her oommeroial interests In the Far East, interests whlch might sufter trom the increase of Japanese influence
in Chlna.

There can be little doubt, however, that this action

was also designed to forestall the possibility of a Russo-Japanese coalition, such as that advocated by Lobanov.
Although the

questi~n

of intervention would seem to

have been decided once and for all by the agreement of Germany

an~

France to partioipate, it still remained very muoh of an open iasue, and revealed once again the diffioulty ot reaching a decision.

Certain ot the Russian ministers, Grand Duke Alexis among

them, tell In with Lobanovta proposal tor an alllance wlth Japan,
though Lobanov himself had to concede his distrust for the Tokyo

25 Mlnutes of April 11 melting in "First Steps ot
Russian Imperialism in the Far East, Chinese Social and PQL1~al
Sclence ,Review, XVIII, 265.
-

26

IbId., 266.
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government.

Th& burden of oppoaing Lobanov'a proposal was assume

by Witte, who outspokenly ins1sted that the de01s10n aa to a

course of action conoerned most ot all the Finanoe Mlnistry because, as he put it, ''In case of a wrong solution we risked to
lose everything wh1ch had been done fio improve Russla's finance8~ "27

Inasmuch as Witte's arg~ent was the one whloh finally

preval1ed over all the contusion, it might be well at this point
to conslderlt in some detall.
Taklng as his starting-polnt the tact that the SinoJapanese War was a direct consequence of the Constructlon of the
Tran8-~iberlan,

Witte went on to observe that the Japanese oocu-

pation of Liso-tung was likewlse direoted against the railway_
All the European powers as well as Japan were aware that a partition of China was only a question of tlme and were becomlng Inoreasingly apprehensive that the rallway would seoure for Rusala
a lion's share of the expected prey.

If allowed to remain in

occupation of -anchuria. Witte argued, Japan would proceed to
annex the whole of Korea, would fortIfy herself in those posltions
and attract to her s1de the belligerent Mongols and Manchus, indeed it was not inconceivable; under such Circumstances, that the
Mikado would at some future date replace the Emperor of China,
Sooner or later, acoording to Witte, a clash with Japan was In-

--------

27 Minutes In "Firat Steps of Russian Imperialism in
the Far East, It Chinese Soclal .!.!l9. Poli tlcal Science Review, XVIII,
265-272.
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evitable.

Consequently, tram the Russian polnt of view, the que

tion was merely whether it was better to conoede South
to Japan and seek compen.at ..

t1

~anchur1a

after the '1'rans-Slberian was com-

pleted, or to take immediate iSBue with Japan.

'1'0 Witte the lat-

ter course appeared more logLcal, inasmuch as France and Germany
were willing to support a protest.
tlon would lead to war.

It was unlikely that such ac-

It, however, contrary to expectations,

diplomatic measures did not suffice, then the Russian .wavy should
be ordered to open hostilities against the Japanese fleet
and to
,
bombard Japanese ports.

The Russian forces already stationed ln

"

the Far East were adjudged sufficient to handle the situation an
besides, ln any resistance to Japanese pretenSions, Russia could
count on the support of the Chinese and Koreans.

By vlrtue of

such an act, concluded Witte, Russla would appear as the uSavior

ot Chlna,P whlch, out ot gratitude, would readily agree to an extension of the Russian frontier.
Later, during the same seSSion, Witte expressed hls
willingness to give Japan anlth1ng-.Fo~osa, the Pesoadores, even
Port Arthur and, in an extreme case, the southern part of Korea.~

not _M.a.n.ch
. u.ri
. . a.
.

The plan to route the maln line of the Trans-

Siberian acros. Manchuria had become so flxed in Wit\ets mind,
that he

w~s

willing to risk even an tmmediate war to prevent

Japan from establishing herself there just when Russ1a's capacitT

•
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for F'ar Eastern expans10n was about to mature. SS

hssla, sa14

Wltte, should acoept thls challenge rather than postpone It.
Otherwise, she "would be obliged ·in the future to make far greater sacrifloes,"et

The AnDY and lavy Mlnlsters concurred in thi8

view, and test1fied to the battle read1ness·and relat1ve surttc1e~C7

ot the Russian forces.

Consequently, the question waa re-

solved much as Witte bad wished.

However, the official report ot
,

the proceedings, along with the concluslons adopted by the Committee, was not submitted to the Tsar until April 15. 30
On April 14, Lobanov conferl'8d w1th the French Ambassa.dor, Count Montebello, who had just returned from Farls.

During

the courae of their conversation Montebello admitted two alternatlve courses of actlons

first, 1ntervention to force Japan to

retrocede Port Arthur and the Pesoadores, second, to allow the
Sino-Japaneae peace settlement to stand.al

If the latter course

was the one adopted, aa Lobanov w1shed, then the question of compenaat10n would have to be oonsidered.

Accordlng to Montebello,

France would be quite satisfled w1th the Chinese Island of H.lna~

28

Romanov, Rosslza

29

-

30

~

Manchzhurl!, 74.

Ibld.
Ibld.

31 Text of Lobanov's report to the Tsar, dated Aprll ~
quoted 1n Chlnese Soclal ~ Political Sclence Rev1ew, XVII, 263264,
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and he left it to Russla to deter.mIne upon a suitable compensation for herself.

Tbe Ambassador pressed for a quick decls10n,

polnting out the extreme Impatlence of the French government.
After reading Lobanov's report of the oonversation, Tsar .Nicholas
notede

"I agree wlth the second suggestion, that is, after an

agreement with France, to aocept carrr1ng out of the Slno-Japan.s

.

peace lettlement, to get by all means a desirable compensation ln
the far.m of an open port."32
In the meantime, the peace negotiatIons at Shimona.eki
were rapidly drawing to a close.

Despite CODstant appeals

~

China, no intervention by anl'" of the Western powers took place
d~ring

the actual oourse of the negotiations.

According to

Article I of the final draft, Chlna recognized definitely "the
full and complete indtpendence and autonomy of Korea," •• the original matter of dispute--and further agreed that "the payment ot
tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formaliti.s by
Korea to China, in the derogatlon of such Independence and eutonoml, shall wholly cease for the tuture.- ZZ

In addltlon, Japan

seoured for herself most-favored-nation status 1n Ch1na. certa1n
addltlonal rights not yet possessed by any foreign power, an Indemnity of two hundred mll1ion taels, and the complete eelslon

l2!!.,

263, n. 11.
~ ~ll{text 1n J. V. A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and
Asree.entsIWitn-.nd conc.r.ni~ Chlna, 1694-1919, Bew York, 191r;
I, ifJ-22, al'S'C)l'~urzon, Pro lems of •
!!£ last. "29."35.
32
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"1n perpetuity and full sovereignty" ot Formosa, the Pescadores,
and the whole ot the L1ao-tung i eninsu1a, 1ncluding Port Arthur.
The Treaty ot Shimonosek1 was tormally signed on Apr11 17, by
voceroy L1 Hung-Chang for China, and Counts Ito and Mutsu tor
Japan.
On April 16, the Tsar

s~oned

for final consultation

tour of the m1nisters who had particlpated in the meetlng of
April ll--Alexls, Lobanov, Witte, and Vannov8ky.

However, as no

official record or transcript of their discussion was kept, it 18
extremely dift1cult to deter.mine what transpired on that occaeon.
The only suggestion as to what took place is provided by a brief
entl'y in Witte's Memoirs, according to which "I reiterated my
opinion and, as it met with practicallino opposition, the
or accepted my suggestions. n34
ence for Lobanov's plan,

EmPer-

The Tsar, reversing his preter-

~proved

the minutes ot the Speoial Com-

mittee meeting of April 11, and instructed Lobanov to carry out
the program outlined in its report, to wita

34 Mem01rs, 84, however Romanov, Ross1la v Manchzhur~
76, argues that £}iIs entl'y in the Memoirs "surfers frOm. inaccuracies which form themselves into a kInd of tendency, distort perspective, and lead the reader on a false track." Whereas Witte
claims to have defended the principle of non-violation ~6r the
integrity of the Chinese Empire," this argument had no place in
his statements at that time, but appeared only after 1907, the
pPOduct of_~ facto intelligence. Likew1se, the reason for
Lobanov'., "SlI8nce fI C!urlng the conference with the Tsar was m.erel:J
the fact that there were before Micholas "two po1nts of view, but
not two conourrent practical proposals,· Lobanov's proposal having already been dismissed from cons1derat1on.
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(1) To enaeavor to preserve the status ~uE ante bellum
in the Norlh ot the Chinese Empire and w t tEIi In vrew
to advise ,apan, first in a friendly way, to desist from
occupation of southern part of manchuria because such occupation interfered with our interests and would be a
permanent menace to the peace of the Far East) in case of
a determined refusal ot ~apan to follow our advice, to
declare to the Japanese government that we reserved for
ourselves treedom of action and would act in conformity
with our interests.
(2) To communioate offIcially to the European powera
as .ell as to China that we on our part without seeking
for any seizures, considered it necessary for the security of our interests to insist upon Japan's foregoing the occupation of the southern part of -anchuria ••• 35

With this the basis for the three-power intervention was firmly
established.

Pursuant to the Tsar's ordera Lobanov immedia.tely

put himself in touch with Berlin and iaris, and on April 23 the
diplomatio representatives of the three powers in Tokyo presented
a formal protest to the Japanese government, calling for the retrocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula to China,
The outcome of the demarohe 1. too well known to be se'
forth in detail here.

After consultat1on with her. military and

naval experts had revealed that resistance to the Dreibund, or
Far Eastern Trlplice as 1t is variously called, was out of the
question, Japan·de.med it wise to capitulate.

Acoordingly, on

May 5, she agreed to retrocede her acquisitions on the mainland,
requestlna~on11

35

that the Treaty of ShimoDosek1 be ratIfied first,

Chinese Soclal

~

Politlcal Soience

R~v1ew,
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and that a s1ight"'1ncrease in the indemni t7 be allowed her.

As

there was no serious objection to either request, the powers assented.

The Trea.ty was ratified at Chefat) on May 8, while a Rus-

s10n fleet comprising seventeen warships and several torpedoboats la7 at anchor ,in the harbor.~6

The final settlement, b7

which Japan agreed to retrocede Liao-tung in return for an increase in the indemnityot thirty million taels, was subscribed
and sworn at Peking on November 8, 1895. 31 .
This was, no doubt, a severe wound to the amour Rropre

ot Japan.

However, the disaPPOintment was accepted by her 1n the

spirit ot stern philosoph1c resignation inher1ted tram her feudal
past.

By way at 11lustrat1on we may c1te the words addressed by

Count Hayashi to his tellow-countrymen, published at that time:
It must never be forgotten that d1scontent is the
prime factor wh1ch incites men to great act1vIty and
diligence. We should theretore retain our d1scontent
to spur us on to greater diligence, with a view to one
day dispersing the gloom around us. We must persistently surrer the insutferable and support the insupportable tor the sake ot what the fl.1h-;.1'O will haVE"; in
store tor us. In this way we shall truly promote the
strength and prosperity of our nation.

36 Morse, International Relat1ons, III, 47, citing
John W. Foster, D1J!lomat1c lemoirs, II, 151. Foster, Secretary of
State during the fiarrlson Aaianlstrat1on, was legal adviser to
the Chinese delegation at Sb1monoseki.
37 Text 1n William W. Rockhill, ed., Treaties and Conventions With or Concern1ng Ch1na and Korea, 1894-1904, Washington, 1904;-26.--The total lnaemnity was thu8 increased to 230 mil
lion taels, or approximately 175 m11l1on dollars.
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We should exert ourselves to develop our commerce
and our industries, tor these are the principal factors
ot national expansion ••••
We must cont1nue to study according to Western methods, tor the application of science is the most important
item of warlike preparations that civilized nations regard. If new ships are considered necessary, we must
b~ild them at any cost. 1t the organization of our anDY
is found to be wrong, it mu~t at once be renovated. It
adVisable, our whole military system must be entirely
changed. We must build docks to be able to repair our
ships. We must establish a steel factory to supply guns
and ammunit10n. Our ra11ways must be extended so that
we can mobilize our troops rap1dly. Our oversea ship.
p1ng must be developed so that we can provide transports
to oarry our ~rm1es abroad.
Th1s is the programme that we have t.o keep alway.
1n view. w~ have suffered hard things, and we must Buftel" yet harder th1ngs before we arrive at our dest1ny.
Wh11st our preparat10ns are 1n the making things w111
not be easy. Vur taxes will increase, our people will
suffer distress, our Government officlals must work for
small salarles, and amidst a disoontented populace. Political parties w11l use the distress to raise po11tioal
d1sputes, and our whole Empire may feel unhappy. But it
we always keep 1n view the great ends which I have indioated, then we shall endure all these things gladly_
Peace has been restored, but it cannot be a lasting peace. We must sacrifice ourselves, we must work
tor those who come after us,.we .ust taoe ditficu1ties,
even as 'comb1ng our hair in the rain and bath1ng in
the wind.' Many w11l be d1sappointed and discontented,
but they must endure all their disappointment and d1scontent 1n silence and with a brave heart.
If they were private merchants they would endure
and continue struggling. As a nat10n we must do the
same. The aotions of great Powers are like those ot
individual merchants. ~aoh one seeks his own gain,
and 1f he cannot at onee win cont1nues w1th increased
energy unt11 he does so at last. 3e
38

lnl

Secret Memg1rl

~

CQuQt TadalY Haygsu1, 104-106.
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This testament of Hayashi reveals the extent to which J'apanese
political thought had been influenced by the west.

It likewise

suggests the determination of the Japanese nation to recover from
the setback administered by Russia and her allies in depriving
her of the fruits of her Victory over China and to even the score
at an opportune moment.
Russia's official interest at this stage, far from the
expansionist policies of Peter the Great, was motivated, as has
already been suggested, by distinctly imperialistic considerations.

The Tsar t s personal intentions were already quite gener-

ally known.

"Emperor Nicholas,n wrote Witte, "was anxious to'

spread Russian influence in the Far East.
definite program of conquest.

Not that he had any

He was merely possessed by an un-

reasoned desire to seize Far Eastern lands."39

Fortunately for

Russia, however, Witte had motives more intelligent.
ceived that " ••• it was to Russia's best

inter~st

He per-

to have as its

neighbour a strong but passive China, and that therein lay the
assurance of Russia's safety in the East. n40

The particular

stress in Witte's mind was perhaps rather on the word "passive"
than on the word "strong," but, whatever the reason, it was to
Russia's interest that China remain, for the time being at least,
unpartitioned.

~or

this reason Russia had taken the lead in or-

39

Memoirs, 83.

40

-Ibid.

78

...

ganlzlng the opposition to the ter.ms which Japan had attempted to
exact of China at Shimonoseki.

This opposition became the basis

for the rivalry which was to dominate Far Eastern relations from
1895 until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.

At this pOint, having established Russia's concern 1n
the Far East, it is relevant to

o~r

purpose to inquire into the

motives of France and Germany in supporting Russia.

The motives

of Britain, in refusing her support, have already been suggested. 4 1

The att1 tude of !t'rance 1s most readily comprehensible.

French policy with respect to the Far East was predicated, as the
French diplomatist, M. Hanotaux, said later, on "considerations
of general policy."42

That is to say, Franoe was bound to Russia

by the F'ranoo-Russian Alliance of 1893. 43

The creation of the

alliance had established a delicate balance of power in Europe,
and it was not France's intention at this time to disturb the
balance.

Consequently, even though she might, and in this situa-

tion probably did, perfer a different course of action, there was
no alternative for her but to tag along 1n opposing the Japanese
demands. 44

France's role 1n the three-power intervention was
41

Supra, 62.

Quoted by Langer, Diplomacy 2! f,mperlalism, 185.
43 For a full aocount of the origin and original intent of the Alliance, cf. Langer, 1!!!. F'ranoo-Russian Alliance,
Cambridge, 1929.
44 The Frenoh preference was undoubtedly the second a~
terrnative prQPosed by Montebello in his conversation with Lobano~
C • sunra, 64.
42
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distinctly secondary to that of Germany and Russia.
The German motives, on the other hand, were somewhat
more numerous and complex, having been dictated by a combination
of considerations, European and Asiatic.

In the first place,

Ger.many had had her eye upon a port in China. "Willy" broached
this matter to "Nlcky" ln a lett'er dated April 26, 1895:
I shall certainly do all ln my power to keep Europe quiet and also guard the rear of Russia so that nobody shall hamper your actlontowards the Far East I
For that ls clearly the great task of the future for
Russia to cu1tlvate the Asian continent and to defend
Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow race. In
this you will always find me on your side ready to help
you as best 1 can. You have well understood that call
of Providence and have quickly grasped the m~ment; lt
ls of immense polltlcal and hlatorical value and much
good wl11 come of It. I ahall with interest awalt the
further development of our action and hope that, just
as I will gladly help you to settle the question 01'
event~al annexations of portlons of territory for Russla, you wl11 klndly see that Germany may also be able
to acguire a Port somewhere where lt does not tgene f
you. 4S
From this it would appear that the Kaiser had finally grasped
what the Iron Chancellor had realized long before--namely, the
expediency of "nailing" Russia's attention to the East,

80

that

it might be diverted from the Balkans and the frussian frontier.
The stronger Russia became in the East, reasoned William II, the
weaker it would become on the Russo-German border; moreover, in
its eastward expansion Russia would embarrass England's interests

45 Letters 'from the Kaiser to the Tsar, Isaac Don
Levlne, ed., New York,-y§20;-9-tO.
-- --- ----
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and would eventually clash with Japan.

At the moment, the usual

friction 'between France and Germany was making itself felt, and
1n the face of this friction the Germans were intent on avoiding,
as Langer puts it, "any consecration of the Franco-Russian coalition, any encouragement of a larger English-Russian-French combination, and any antagonism betwe.en Germany and her continental
neighbora. n46

Consequently, Germany had nothing to lose and much

to gain by fostering friendly relations with France and Russia.
A still further reason for Germany's participation in
the Dreibund i8 the fact that the Kaiser seemed conf1dent that by
joining"the intervention and having a voiee in the resettlement
he could thereby ingratiate himself with the Chinese and, at the
same time, insure Germany a voice in all future dealings of Europe and Asia.

There can be no doubt that William II was fully

aware of the: possibilities for German political and commercial
development in the

i'll!-

East.

Perhaps even m.ore interesting,

however, when viewed in the light of in.ternational diplomacy, was
the Kaiserts use of the "Yellow Perl1" to scare Nicholas and to
gain publio support for a more forward Aslatlc polley.

That he

envisioned, or at least pretended to envlslon a future conflict
between East s.nc West, is evident from his letters to the Tsar.
"The development of the Far East," he wrote to Nicholas on Septem
46
Politlk, IX,

Dlplomacl of Imperiallem, 184-185, citlng Die Grosa

No.

~135.
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ber 26, 1895,
especially its danger to Europe and our Christian F'ai th
is a matter which has been greatly on my mind ever since
we made our first move together in Spring. At last my
thoughts developed into a certain for.m and this I sketched
on paper •••• lt the sketch shows the Powers of Europe
as represented by their respective Genii called together
b7 the Arch-Angel Michael,--sent from Heaven--to unite
in resisting the inroad of Buddhism, heathenism ane barbarism for the Defence of the Cross. Stress is especially laid on the united resistance of all European Powers, which is just as necessary also agaInst our common
internal foes, anarchism, republicanism, nihilism. I
venture to send you an engraving, begging you to accept
it as a token of my warm and sincere friendship to you
and Russia. 4'7
For these several reasons and, no doubt, for others as well, the
.,

German government ranged itself in the East, on the side of the
alignment which had been formed against itself in the West.
Britain, in declining to intervene, committed a blunder
the full consequences of which she failed to realize until it was
too late.

At the time there were no foreseeable advantages in

joining the intervention, and she proceeded on the theory that a
strong Japan must needs by cultivated to replace an impotent
China as Britain's eastern bulwark against Russia.

liowever, in

failing to see in Japan a serious threat to her commercial interests in the F'ar East, Sri tain completely misjudged the situation,
and lived to regret the error as Japanese trade gradually superceded its own.

By not intervening, Britain did court Japan, but

in so doing abdicated its dominant influence in Peking in favor
4'7

Letters ~

lh! Kaiser !2

~!!!I, 16-17.
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of Russia, the very power which it sought to halt. 48

Brltain's

decllning position was later buttressed by a rapprochement with
Japan, and the void created by her abdication was supplied by the
emergence of

Ge~any

as a Far Eastern power.

Perhaps the c8.rdinal phenomenon of the realignment of
powers in the F'ar East in the decade 1895-1904 was the placing in
contrast of "progressive It Japan and Britain, later to be joined
by the United States, against "backward" Russia. 49

What might

have happened had Russia followed Lobanov's advice and joined
Japan in picklng China's bones it ls quite useless to speculate.
Lobanov's wl11 dld not prevail, and lnstead, a

cha"~-reactlon

ot

events which would have world-wlde signlficance was set inm.tion
in large measure, by the will of one man--Sergel Wltte.

By inlt-

iating the Triple Intervention Russla had won a brilliant dlplomatic vlctory:

Japan was repulsed, Brltaln humbled, and China

placed in her debt. 50

However, Russia's diplomatlc Victory, 11ke

the military vlctory of Japan over China, was short-lived, and

48

Ramanov, Rosslya

49

Da11in,

1!!.!.! .2!

~

Manchzhuri1, 11-12.

Russia!!!!!!!"

41.

50 There ls considerable divergence of opinion among
scholars as to which of the three powers actually initiated the
interventlon. However, from the evidence already cited here ln
describing the origin and development of the Dreibund, it is certaln that the initiative for the move 1s to be found in St. Pe~m
burg, rather than i~ Paris or Berlin. Specifically, the th~e
power intervention nad its origin in the Russian policy dlscusslons of Aprl1 11 and 16.

~----------------------~
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was won at the expense of alienating the Russian Empire's mortal
enemies, Japan and Great Britain.
On paper the Dreibund was a very formidable combination
of powers and, up to a pOint, an effective working partnership as
well.

O!Jtensibly" the chief bond uniting the three nations was

the desire to impress the Chinese'with their good will.

Under-

lying this, however, was the realization that conoerted aotion
would contribute to the eventual breakdown of British hegemony in
the F'ar East.
dent;

The inherent weakness of the oombination is evi-

each of the thr$e powers was out to seoure advantages for

itself. 51

Aooording to a Russian statement published at the tim.

in the Novole Vremya, Rulsia paid for the oooperation of Franoe
with an agreement "to support an eventual French demand for a
rectification ot the Indo-Chinese frontier, and for Germany's
help with a promise to advance German demands for industrial and
commercial conoelsions in China. 52

Thus, even as early as 1895,

it became fully evident that Russia and rrapan, both nations in
full progrels, both operating in the same sphere of action, must
sooner or la ter meet face to face.

51

Langer, Dip10macl

~

Imperialism" 187-189.

,,~ 52 Issue dated April 22, 1895, cited by Pooley, The
Secret !emoirs ~ ~alashi, 50.
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CHAPTER V
RUSSIAN ASCENDANCY IN KOREA
Throughout the course of the Sino-Japanese War and the
subsequent peace negotiations at Shimonoseki, Russia had continued to manifest a vital interest in the affairs of the Korean
government, being particularly conoerned with the guarantee of
Korean "independence" and territorial integrity.

This is evident

from the decisions of the Special Committee, discussed in the pr.
vious chapter, notwithstanding the fact that in its deliberation.
the Korean question had assumed an importance more or less subordinate to that of

~9nchuri9.

Meanwhile, however, events within

the Korean peninsula were working to Russia's advantage much more
effeotively, perhaps, than if Russia herself had been guiding
them.

It will be recalled that, previous to the outbreak of the

war between China and Japan, the Japanese had invaded the royal
palace and seized the person of the king, making him a prisoner
in his own palace.l

Thereupon the administration of the country

was assumed by a cabinet of pro-Japanese Koreans, with the aged

1

Supra, 53.

p
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Tai-Wen-Kun acting

BS

regent.

Under the supervision of a group

of Japanese advisers the government of Korea was reorganized the
better to subserve Japanese interests in the peninsula, as well
as to eliminate onoe and for all the traces of Korea's "ConfUoian
dependence upon China. 2

All this was done with a pretext to se-

curing Koreats "independence."
Diplomatio procedures proving too slow for the realizatton of absolute hegemonJ in Korea, however, the Japanese onoe
again had recourse to more forceful measures.

In an effort to

stamp out all internal opposition to such control, the Japanese
agent, General Muira, arranged the assassination of his most outspoken opponent, the Korean Queen, by a group of Japanese soshi,
or strong-arm men.
1896, in the palace.

The murder was accomplished on October
The body was then removed

by, saturated with kerosene, and

bu~ed.3

t~

8

g~ve

a,
near-

Shortly thareafter

Muira appeared at the palace and presented for the king's signature several prepared documents oalling for the apPointment to
office of certain of the oonspirators and agreeing to the management of all internal affairs by the Japanese-dominated oabinet. 4

2 The nature and extent of this reorganization is desoribed by Nelson, Korea ~ ~ 2!2 Orders, 224-226.
3 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 228, citing Kore~~
RetpSitor!h III, (1898), 12lr-!2~216=2~O. Of. also RomerE.
Hu bert, --! Passing ~ Korea, New York, 1906, 137-139.
4

Nelson, Korea

~ ~ ~

Orders, 228.
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Revulsion against this crime brought severe criticism both at
home and abroad, yet the Japanese government took no action other
than to recall Mu1ra.

As no foreign opposition was forthcoming,

the internal situation was allowed to stand. 5
Events reached a climax on February 11, 1896, when the
King, disguised as a woman, managed to escape from his Japanese
captors and took refUge in the Russian legation in Seoul, where
he remained for el[aotly a year.

Inasmuch as Japanese control had

clearly centered in the possession of the Kingfs person, all illusions of Japanese domination in the peninsula were now comp1et
11' shattered.

Thus, as Langer puts it, "the Russians suddenly

found themselves on the crest of the 'wave.

The Japanese, by

their indefensible polIcy, had done the work ot the Ru.,saians more
effectively than the Russians themselves could have done it.· e
Russia was now not only the "Savior of China," but by reason ot
this most recent development she had emerged also as the "protector· of Korean independence.
In this situation Russia found seope tor implementing
her Korean policy.

Not

wi~hing,

however, to disSipate the ini-

tial advantage, she played her hand somewhat more cautiously than
5 The American Minister at Seoul, Mr. Sll1, was seve
ly reprimanded by the Secretary of State for even suggestlng a
protest: "intervention in polltlcal concerns of Korea is not
among your fUnctions. 1I Telegram, November 11, 1895, clted in
Morse, International Relations, III, 46-47.
6

Diplomacl2! Imperlallsm, 297.

87

had Japan.

At first the Russians were quite content to pursue a

policy based on ingratiation ana gentle persuasion, keeping their
own designs temporarily in the background.

Meanwhile, from his

asylum in the Russian legation the king issued proclamations
annulling the Japanese-imposed reforms, announcing the dismissal
of the pro-Japanese cabinet and the creation of a new cabinet to

.

take its place, in short, reconstituting his own rule. 7

One such

royal proclamation, issued the very day of the Kingt. escape,
read in part as follows I
Alas! Alas' on account of Our unworthiness and
mal-administration the wicked advanced and the wise
retired. Of the last ten years, none has passed without troubles. Some were brought on by those We had
trusted as the members of the body, while othe~s, by
those of Our own bone and flesh. Our dynasty of five
centuries has thereby been often endangered, and millions of Our subjects have thereby been gradually impoverished ••••
Fortuna"tely, through loyal and fai thfUl subjects
rising up in righteous efforts to remove the wlcked,
there ls a hope that the tribulations experienced may
lnvlgorate the state, and that calm may return after
the storm •••• We shall endeavour to be mercifUl. No
pardon, however, shall be extended to the principal
traitors concerned in the affairs of July 1894 and ot
October 1895. Capital punishment should be their due,
thus venting the indignation of men and gods a11ke.
But to all the rest, officials, or soldier, citizens
or coolles, a general amnesty. free and full, 1s
granted, irrespectlve of the degree of their offencee.
Reform your bus1ness, public or private, as in times
past •••• 8
7

Isabella L. Blshop, Korea
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1898, 365- 368.

8

Quoted by Bishop, Korea
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To bis soldiers the King addressed these wordss
On account of the unhappy fate of Our country,
traitors have made trouble every year, Now We have a
document informing U. of another conspiracy. We have
therefore come to the Russian Legation •••• Soldiers!
come and protect USe You are Our children •••• Do your,
duty and be at ease. When you meet the chief traitors
••• cut off their heads at once and bring them. 9
In accordance with this edict of· the King, and in retaliation for
the murder of the Queen, a blood purge was instituted, in which
the former premier and several cabinet-ministers, some of them
quite innooent of the crime, were killed by mobs in the streets
of Seoul. 10
The first lines of Russian poliey, namely ingratiation
and "gentle persuasion," paid SUbstantial dividends in securing
the implicit trust and confidence of the Korean monaroh, to whom
it appeared that Russia was merely aiding in the restoration ot
th~

status quo ante bellum in the peninsula.

During the corona-

tion festivities for the new Tsar held in May and June of 1896
a special Korean representative, a brother to the murdered queen,
made his appearance in Moscow.

HaVing secured a private audience

with the Tsar, he presented on behalf of the Korean King a request for the establishment of ' a Russian protectorate

9

~.,

367.

10

Hulbert,
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Wlthout consultlng elther Lobanov or Witte before commlttlng hlmself to such

fA

o.rastic course, Nicholas granted the request then

and there, seeing ln lt nothlng but

"8

very proper acknowledgment

of and homage to his power and greatness. rtl2

The verr serious

international compllcatlons to which such action on the part of
Russla might give rise entirely escaped the young Tsar. 13 Both
Lobanov and Witte were of the oplnion that the situation was not
as yet propitious for the realization of such a protectorate.
Consequently, the fact of the promlse havlng been glven was kept
highly secret. 14
Japan, at thls time, had not quite succeeded ln reconcillng herself to her sudden loss of power ln Korea, and was engaged ln a large-scale program of ml1itary and naval rearmament
along Western 11nes. 15

Russia, for her part, was directing her

every effort to the earllest posslble completion of the Siberlan.
Rallway.

Consequently, it became the primary task of Russian

diplomacy to maneuver cautiously untl1 such tlme as sufflclent
force was available to sustain a more aggressive policy.

The

extremely delicate nature of the situation ln whlch Russla found

12

Rosen, Fortz Years

S! Diplomacy, I, 125.

13 Ibld., 125-126. Thenceforward Rosen detects a
marked Iteoolne~affeetlng the r>ela tions between the Tsar and
Lobanov.
14

15

Ibid.
-Langer,
Dlplomaci £! Imperialism,
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herself as a result of the sudden change in the political power
balance in Korea, not to mention the Tsar's rash promise of a
protectorate, was reflected. 1n two agreements negotiated between
Russia and Japan in May and June of 1896.

In general, these

treaties had the effect of establishing a more-or-less £2n

-

num over Korea between Russia and Japan_

~

They were of special

importance to Russia because Japan reaffirmed Korea's independ-

ence, to Japan because Russ'ia pledged itself to send no mi11tal7'
or financ1al advisers into the peninsula. 1S
The first of the aforementioned Russo-Japanese agreements, the so-called Waeber-Komura Agreement, was signed at Seoul
on May 14, 1896. 17

According to the terms of the compact, Japan

recognized that the Korean King remained at the Russian legation
of his own volition and at his own d1scretion, while Russia agxeec
to advise his departure at such time as his personal safety W&s
no longer in question.

To insure the kingfs safety, Japan under-

took to restrain those of its subjects who advocated forceful
action in Korea.

Moreover, Japan was constrained to recognize

the new Korean Cabinet, and agreed to restrict the number and dis

16

Romanov, Rossiya

~

.anchzhurii, 143.

17 Text in Korea: Treaties and Aareements, Pamphlet
No. 43, ot the Carnegie Endowment for Internationa! Peace, Division of International Law, Washington, 1921, 21-22. Both Waeber
and Komura were the ofticial diplomatic representatives of their
respective governwents at Seoul. The document is sometimes referred to QS the ~eoul Memorandum. ft
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position of its troops and telegraph guards in the peninsula.
hussia was allowed to maintain a force equal in number to that ot
Japan. 18 However, both sides were to wi thdra1f when order had b3en
restored.
The means by which Russia would attempt to consolidate
and give definite form to its influence in Korea remained a completely open question.

Japan, at the same time, was confronted

with the first-class problem of blocking the path to any further
extension ot Russian influence in Korea.

This, ostensibly, was

the origin of the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement, negotiated in the
early days of June, 1896, and signed on June 9 of that year.
Expanding on the earlier agreement, it provided, in substance,
that neither of the contracting parties would lend finaneial aid
to Korea by Dmutual accord," and that Korea should be allowed to
establish an armed foree and a native police "in sufficient proportions to maintain internal order wi thout foreign aid ... 19

In

this way Japan hoped to forestall the possibility of complete
Russian dominl)tton over Kor:Ja, either through loans or through
control over its armed forces and police,

18 The total strength of the Japanese force was set at
1,000 men: 200 telsgraph guards, 800 guards for Japanese settlements in FUsan, Genzan, and Seoul. However, as Romanov points
out, such a limitation constituted a virtual evacuation of the
Japanese forces stationed in Korea. Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 142.
19

Full text in Korea,

Tree ties .!.!'lll Agreements, 23-24
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More signifioant, in the light of subsequent developments, is the faot that the agreement, as finally approved by
Russia and Japan, was but a substitute for a more radioal solution proposed by Japan 1n the early stages of the

negotiations~

Yamagata, Japan's spec1al representative to the coronation festlvi ties, had initially suggested 'a partition of Korea at the
thirty-eighth parallel.

The northern part would become a Russian

sphere, the southern, including Seoul, would go to Japan. 20
asmuch as the proposal had clearly been inspir.d by

In-

considera~.

of national self-interest on the partot Japan, it is not surprising to find that it was rejected by Russia tor muoh the same reasons.

Basioally, Russiafs rejection stemmed from the reoognition

that at the moment her influence in Korea was,
than that of Japan.

~

facto, stronger

To agree to suoh a partition, Russia would

not only have had to surrender the most important part of Korea,
trom the military-strategic point of view, but also to compromise
her futuretreedom of action in the peninsula. 21
divide KoreR

w1~h

it all to herself?
thirty~eighth

Besides, why

Japan when, in the near future, ahe might have
Thus, for the first time in history the

parallel was proposed as a 11ne dividing Korea into

two foreign protectorates.

As we already know, it was not to be

20 Romanov, ROlsira v Manchzhurii, 142-143, cf. also
Langer, Diplomacy ~ Imperia Ism, i06.
21 ROi.4anov, ~,stif.x Manc f;Qu l, 14Z, citing a
letter of the ).ater Fore gn ~ nTs£er, D amsr ortt, read at the Imperial Conference ot May 20~ 190Z.

a
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the last.
If the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement had been sacredly observed in the subsequent period, it might be possible to say that
it preserved the illusory independence of Korea.

However, as the

Russian historian Romanov points out, Russia, in signing the pac\
was clearly double-crossing Japan. 22

The evidence which he addu-

ces is so conclusive as to leave little room for doubt as to
Russia's bad faith.

It will be recalled that the Tsar had pre-

viously committed Russia to the establishment of a protectorate
over Korea.

The preCise form which this protectorate was to take

was not disclosed until after the Russo-Japanese treaty had been
signed--nor, for that matter, the fact that any such agreement
eXisted.

Then it appeared that Russia had undertaken to supply

a military patrol to "protect" the Korean King, as well as military instructors for the Korean army.

Furthermore, a Russian

financial adviser was to be attached to the Korean Court, and a
Russo-Korean loan negotiated as soon as the financial needs of
the Korean government had been made clear. 23

That these condi-

tions were retrograde, both in spirit and substance, to the terms
of the Moscow Protocol is fully evident, and they provide an interesting commentary on the duplicity of Russia's Korean policy

22

Rossi:a

~ ~anchzhurii,

144.

23 Ibid., 144-145, Citing the letter of Lobanov to
Witte, June 16-;-n96.
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at this time. ~Only when the Korean ambassador returned from
Moscow with the first group of Russian instructors was there any
indication that Russia had no intention of abiding by the terms
of the agreement. 24
Concurrent with its negotiations wi th Japan over Korea,
the Russian government was also c.e.rrying on negotiations with
China for railway rights in Manchuria.

For some time the builder

and planners of the Trans-Siberian had recognized how greatly'the
work of construction might be facilitated and how substantial an
economy in time and distance might be effected if, instead of
following the circuitous route along the Amur River, the line
could be carried directly across Manchuria.

This idea had actu-

ally predated the Triple Intervention, although it gained virtually no support or momentum up until that t1me. 25

Investigations

in the summer of 1894 had disclosed almost insuperable technical
difficulties of construction, particularly in the Lake Baikal and
Amur River areas, and inspired Witte to consider the political
and economic advantages lat~nt in the Manchurian route. a6

Tbese

advantages he outlined in a report to the Siberian Railway

Oomm~

24 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 233, citing
letter of Allen to Olnay, ~ctOOer-27;-rage.
25 Romanov, Roseila v Manchzhur1i, 82. According to
Romanov, the idea ortginated with a certaIn Admtral Kopytov as
early 8S 1887.
26

Witte.

~emoirs,

86-87.
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tee:

not only would such a route be shorter by some three hun-

dred and forty-five miles and appreciably cheaper, but it could
also better compete with the existing sea. rout8 •• 27

Furthermore,

once she had the line direct to Vladivostok, no other railway
could be constructed in Northern China without Russian consent.
In Manchurian matters; however, the Russians made hast
slowly.

Witte, the prime-mover in all matters related to the

construction of the railway, laid his plans carefUlly so as to
obviate all possibility of failure.

The first and most importan

reqUisite to success, as he saw it, was the establishment of a
Russian bank in China.

Such a bank, Witte wrote to the Tsar,

might "prove to be a very useful weapon in the hands of the Russian government in the letter's carrying out of the measures mos
closely connected wi th the completion of the Siberian Railway. "2
Plans for the formatlon of the bank took definite shape In Witte'
mlnd in June, 1895, when li'rench financiers arrived ·in st. Peters
burg to negotiate the joint loan which would enable Chins. to pa7
off the Japanese indemnity.29

The Russo-Chinese Bank. later

known as the RUBso-Aslatio Bank, came into being by an Imperial
Russian Charter of December 10, 1895, and In Witte's hands was to

28

92, citing report dated aovember 11, 1895.
-Ibid.,
Letter of Ju17 26, 1895, quoted in
92.

29

Romanov,

27

~.,

R08~iza ~ ~nchzhurii,

90.

4- ,

,

3
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become an integral part of the Trans-Siberian scheme and a flexible instrument in his policy of "conquest by railways."SO
Nominally, the bank was an ordinary joint-stock company formed, accirding to its charter, for the purpose of developing commercial relations with the Far East.

Its capital, fixed

at 11,250,000 gold rubles. in addi'tion to five m11110n taela advanced on permanent loan by the Chinese government. was subscri
1n part by four of the leading banks of Paris and many of the
leaders af the French financial world. 3l Among its functions-over and above the right to engage in regUlar banking operation
the Russo-Chinese Bank was empowered to engage in such d1vers.
pursuit! as the followingt
The collection of dut1es in the Emp1reof China,
and the transactions relat1ng to the State treasurJ of
the respect1ve place, the COinage, with the author1zation of the Chinese Government, of the country's money,
the payment of the 1nterest on loans, concluded by the
Chinese Government, the acquisition of conceasiona for
the construction of railways w1thin the boundaries of
China and the establishment of telegraph 11nea. 32
Also worthy of note i8 the fact that all of the important admin-

&0 Text of the Charter 1n Rockh111, Treaties and Conventions ~ .2! concernip.g Ohina ~ Korea, lS94-i§04, ~-~.

31 Morse, International Relat10ns, III, 83. Of the
six million rubles actuaiiy raIssa, 57a was Ii'rench. 3/8 Russian.
Nevertheless, of the nine votes Russia commanded six. Cf. Romanov, Rosaiya ~ Manchzhurii, 91, n. 2.
32 Rockhill, Treatiea and Conventions, 209.
quoted section 1s A~ticle XIV of U\i aharter. _.

Tbe abo

.
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lstrative posts were held by Russians, the president of the bank
being Witte's chief lieutenant, Prince Esper Ukhtomsky, companion
to Nicholas on his Far Eastern tour of 1890-1891, and an ardent
apologist for Russia's "manifest destiny" in Asia.

All this

would seem to bear out the truth of Baron Rosents description ot
the bank as

ua

hybrid politico-financial institution which in

reality was but a slightly disguised branch of the Russian Treasury. ,,~~
The establishment of the Russo-Chinese Bank was but a
means taken by Witte to the ultimate end of securing from China
railway rights in

~anchuria.

Should such rights be obtalned--and

there was no reason to doubt that they would--then the instrumentality for putting them into effect already existed in the bank.
Preliminary negotiations for railway rights were conducted in
Peking from December, 1895, to April, 1896, by the Russian Minister, Count Cassinl, and were conspicuous for their lack of success.

Even attempts at briblng the obstinate ChInese officials

proved tutIle, reported Cassini, chiefly because of apprehension
on the part of the Chinese that "in the near future we will demanc
certain exclusive concessions, the true significance and extent
of which we now conceal."34

~3

Forty Years

~

Diplomacy, I, 198.

M Telegram of Cassinl, December 28, 1895, ct ted by
Romanov, J3Re31~' Jt Ianibzburl1, 96. The idea of plaCing a certait
amount of bri e money at 0888ini'8 disposal originated with

,, __-------------------------------------------------------'-,j-L-ZZ-Ai-"
__
,
\
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A more auspicious issue of the Manchurian question was
presaged by the appointment of Li Hung-Chang as China's Ambassador Extraordinary to the Coronation of Nicholas II.
take fUll advantage of Lits

presen~e

Russia would

at the event much as she had

availed herself of the Japanese and Korean representatives.

,

plan of operations was mapped out
well in advance of Li t

S

A

fA. the minutest detail by Witte

~

arri val;"'l:' St. Petersburg on April 30.

Indicative of the care with which Witte's plans were laid is the
fact that he even arranged to have Li met at Suez by Prince Ukhtomsky and carried directly to Odessa, so as to preclude any possibility

~f

his being seduced prematurely by any other European

power. 35
The

~o

giants of Far Eastern diplomscy conferred in

st. Fetersburg for three weeks in deepest secrecy, after which
negotiations were resumed and concluded in Moscow.

After pre-

liminary assurances that Russie lntended to adhere strictly to
the principle of China's territorial integrity, Witte proceeded
to point out that to do so effectively she must be in a position
to render China armed aSSistance, which at the moment was practically impossible because of the lack of railroad faoilities.

By

way of a solution Witte proposed that Russia be allowed to lay a
Witte and was approved by the Tsar. However, none of the funds
were used at this time. Ibid., 92-93.

-

35 This and other detalls of Lifs reception are recounted by Witte, ~emoirs, 87.
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branch line of the Trans-Siberian from Chi~ to Vladivostok.

To

make his argument more persuasive, Witte recalled for L1 f a benef1t the services which Russia had reoently performed in arrang1ng
the Tr1ple Intervention and the indemnity loao.

Such a railroad,

he added, would increase the economic product1vity of both empires. 36
Li, tully oognizant of the disagreeable and dangerous
features of the Russ1an proposal, was reluctant to agree.

Con-

sequently, Witte was forced to resort to bribery as a means of
securing Lits support.

In his Memoirs Witte emphatioally denies

the use of bribes, but the evidence is much too conclus1ve to admi t of any doubt. 37

Romanov quotes in full a Ministry of Finance

Protocol whioh assigned a fund of three million rubles credit to
be advanced to Li, payments to be made in

lnst~llmente

of one

million rubles eaoh at the follow1ng spec1f1ed times,
(l)

upon the concession of the line to the Russo-Chinese Bank by an edict of the Chinese Emperor;

(2)

the determ1nation of the exact route ana its conf1rmation by Chinese law; and

(3)

the oompletion of the ra1lroad.

36 The Li-Witte oonversations are discussed by the
latter in ibid., 88-90. Cf. also Romanov, Rossila.! 14anchzhurii,
107-117.
37 Memoirs, 95. "At the time 1t was rumored in Europe
I remember, that t! Hung Chang had been bribed by the Russian
Government. I must say that there is not a particle of truth 1n
th1s rumour." Techn1cally, this statement of Witte is quite oorrect&-!naamu.ch
thebr1be wa.st;:<:uaranteed, not by the Russian
gov8£"Qment, DU t ll.8
.Dy~~e HU8so-cn nese ~ank.
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Withdrawals against this fund were to be entered as "expenses of
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway."38

Li gave in and

applied to Peking for the desi red concession, perm1.ssion for 1¥h1cl'l
was gran ~Qd on May 50.
on June 3, 1896. 39

Aacordingly, the secre t trea ty was signed

By this agreement the Russo-Chinese Bank received the
right to construct and exploit a railway through

Manchuri~,

Rusml

to have the right to transport its troops over the line in war
and peace. 40

In return for this concession China received a mu-

tual defense pact against any further Japanese aggression, this
being the price that Russia had to pay for the railway concession
and also a face-saving device with which China could cover her
humiliation.

The treaty was so constituted as to make it appear

that the .lliance was its primary concern, the I'ailway me :.:-ely a
means of implementing the military provisions of the alliance.
It is significant, from the point of view of this study, that the

3B Romanov, Ros8~a v Manchzhurii, 116, citing Secret
Protocol ot June 4, 189g.e protocof was drawn up the day
after the signing ot the treaty, presumably to give Li some written assurance of payment.
39 Li did not receive the first million until September, 1896. According to Ro~nov, this was the only payment he
actually received from the fUnd. Ibid., 118-119.

-

Text in J. V.,A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agre.
ments with and concernigs China, 1894-1919, Washington, 1921, f,
sl. French text In RomanoT, Ross!fal.!.-ra'iiChZhUr1i, 111-1.13.,
~o

"
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terms of the agreement

ext~nded

and Chinese possessions:

to Korea as well as to Russian

"Any attack by Japan on Russian terri-

tory in East Asia as well as on the territory of China or Korea
will be considered cause for the application of this treaty. ft 41
However, the tree ty was no t to become final until China had confirmed the contract for the railroad.
Shortly thereafter, on September 8, 1898, the contract
was negotiated between the Imperial Chinese government and the
Russo-Chinese Bank, providing for the construction and management
of the projeoted new line--the "Chinese Eastern," as it was
cal1ed. 42
lines

-i.n

Acoording to the agreement, China might redeem the
thirty-six years, and at the end of eighty years, dating

from the opening of the line over its entire system, they were to
revert to her wi thout payment.

A' careful examination of this

agN"ment reveals beyond all shadow of doubt that the Chinese
Eastern Railway;was, in reality, a Russian one.
tracts

~i1l

A few brier ex-

suffice to make this cleare

••• The statutes of this Company will be in conformity with the Russian usages in regard to railways •
••• The gauge of the line should be the same as that
of the Russian railways (five Russian f.et--about four
feet two and one-half inches, Chinese) •
.••• The Compan'1 will have the absolute and excluai ve
right of administration of its lands ••••
41
42

-Ibid.
Text in ibid.,

-

74-·77.
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Tbe Company is responsible that the Russlan troops
and war material, dispatched ln translt over the line,
will be carried through directly from one Russlan station to another, without for any pretext stopplng on
the way longer than ls strictly neces.ary ••••
Passengers' baggage, as well as merchandise dispatohed ln translt from one Russian station to another,
will not be subject to customs dutles; they wll1 11kewise be exempt from any internal tax or duty •••• 43

· were to be tax tree, and
Moreover, all profits of the company
only Russian and Chinese subjects could be shareholders. 44

The

right to acquire and exploit mines and other concessions was also
given.

The statutes of the newly formed Company were approved by
the Tsar on December 16, 1896. 46 "With this," writes Langer,

"the preparation for the Great Russian enterprise was complete,
the Russlan government had succeeded in cloaking its action by
using the fiction of a private company, and everything was regulated to meet the need. of the government

8S

Witte saw them. R46

The strategiC and political implications of this
sian move are manifest.

43

~t'

Ru.-

Not only would Russian offices have to

pas.im.

44 Witte saw to it that all the shares, one thou.and
in number, fell into Russian handst Seven hundred were reserved
for the Ru.sian government; the remaining three hundred, set
aside for private purohase, were absorbed by the Russo-Chinese
Bank. Cf. Romanov, Ro.eila ~ Manchzhurii, 12.
45 Text in Treaties and Asreements with and cOI'.cerni!!C
China, I, 84-88.
,,46

Diplomacy

s!

ImRerialism, 409-410.
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be set up in Manchuria, but an armed guard stationed there as
well, thUB throwing wide open the Goor to Russian penetration,
The Trans-Siberian, no longer a purely internal enterprise running through unknown territories to terminate in a Pacific port
had. by virtue of the Manchurian alignment, become a world highway from west to East, and had
affairs.

pass~d

into the domain of foreign

Furthermore, it had developed into a political instru-

ment whose far-reaching effects it was difficult to

gauge~-a wor~

as one author wrote at the time, "destined to playa premier part
in the transformation of Asia.""?

This prediction, as we shall

Bee, was more than borne out by subsequent events,
By the end of 1896 Russia was, to all intents and pur-

poses, so absorbed in consolidating its most recent gains in
Manchuria that Korea was relegated to the background.

However,·

to inter trom this that Witte had sacrificed Korea to the pros.
pect ot more immediate gains in Manchuria is to overlook certain
considerations which were implicit in Witte's thinking,

The dis.

tinction here, as before, is one between the means and the end.
Rejecting the narrow view that in undertaking the Manchurian rallway Russla was merely trying to assert itselt In Manchuria, Witte
remarked rather candidly that "Manchuria is not worth going to

47 Archlbald R. Colquhoun, "The Trans-Siberian-Manchurian Railway," Rotal United Service Institution Journal, London,
~t)OO. 1418.

,..,
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all the trouble. n48

Instead, he preferred to rest his justifica-

tion of the enterprise on the fact that it would open for Russia
an ever-broadening wedge of penetration:

"the very force of

things will oblige us short;ty to carry through branches from this
main line into the very depths of China."49

Therefore, by con-

solidating her position and increasing her means of action in
Manchuria, Russia was enlarging upon rather than lessening her
chances in Korea, and at the same time conserving instead of dissipating her energy.
Although urged to take immediate steps to insure the
realization of the Korean protectorate, Witte stood firm in his
opposition to any precipitate action.

Both Lobanov and Pokotilov

Witte's China agent, anxiously called his attention to the fact
that at that very moment British and French agents in Korea were
attempting to force loans upon that unhappy kingdom, and earnestly urged him to

~ake

immediate action on the question of a Rus-

sian loan and the establishment of a Russo-Korean bank. 50

Witte

oategorically forbade any action being taken until November, 1896,
at which time he approved the loan only in prinCiple and on the
condition that a Russian be placed in charge of the Korean Cus-

48

As quoted by Romanov, Rossila

49

~.,

99.

50

-Ibid.,

149-150.

~

Manchzhurii, 80.
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toms Service. 51

This condition entailed something of a revolu-

tIon in Korean internal affairs, inasmuch as it involved the expulsion of British influence which had sustained itself solely
on the basis of its administration of the Korean Customs.
Needless to say, there was considerable opposition in
St. Petersburg foreign circles to such a long-range F'ar Eastern
policy as Witte proposed.

The con,troversy which ensued

containe~

in an incipient stage, almost all the elements of the struggle
carried on in the following decade, and was but a foreshadowing
of the eventual breakdown of Russian policy in the F'ar East.

For

the time, however, Witte was the virtual dictator of Tsarist Far
Eastern policy, and was quite willing to forego immediate partial
gain for the sake of the future whole.

Consequently, the plans

for the Korean protectorate were put temporarily

Q

on ice,"

Russia under Witte directed its attention elsewhere.

8S

However, as

we have seen, Korea occupied a place of paramount importance in
Witte's plans for a Russian-dominated East.

As the later Minis-

ter of Foreign Affairs, Lamsdorff, recalled on the eve of the
"

war that was to terminate once for all Tsarist designs on Korea:
"The fat;, cf K~rea, as a :-:,l.tuJIi component of the Russian Empire,
due both to political and

geo~Faphic

considerations, was early

51 Ibid., citing letter of Witte to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 14, 1895.
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determined by us.u52

52 Letter read at the Imperial Conference of May 20,
1903, cited in ~., 66.

..,

CHAPTER VI
DECLINE AND FALL
Whether or not the motives underlying the construction
of the Manchurian branch of the ·Trans-Siberian Railway were basically military and strategic rather than economic, the fact
remains that they were so interpreted by the other powers.

Con-

sequently, as Wittefs policy of "peaceful penetration" gained in
momentum, it also stirred the other powers to bring corresponding
counter-pressure to bear.
to their strategy.

Once again Korea provided the fulcrum

The activities of British and French agents

who were attempting to force loans upon Korea have already been
mentioned. 1

Japan, still smarting under the blow received at the

hands of the Dreibund, was further provoked to action by the nowevident duplicity of Russia in signing the Lobanov-Yamagata Protocol when all the while she had no intention of abiding by its
tenms.

Germany, for her part, was sitting tight, waiting for the

opportune moment to seize the Chinese port of Kiao-chow.
In the early months of 1897 Russia's position in Korea
gave evidence of geteriorating.

1

Sup:r~.

In February of that year, in

104.
107
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response to the many memorials of his subjects, the King departed
from the Russian legation for his newly-constructed palace near
the American legation.

He did so without interference on the

part of the Russians, 'though not before he had granted to Russian
companies a twenty-year lumber monopoly along the River Tiumen,
a five-year lumber option in the Ya1u Valley, as well as 'a mining
concession in the Ham-Kyang Province. 2 After the King's depar~
Russia's posl'tion in the peninsula was further compromised when"
in March, the Japanese government communicated to Korea the text
of the theretofore secret Lobanov-Yamagata agreement. 3

With this

a marked cooling of Korea's affection for her would-be "protector" set in.

Disillusioned with Russia's dilatory tactics in the

matter of the loan" and finally awakening to her duplicity in
promising military and financial adVisers, the King openly solicitated aid from Germany and F'rance, even going so far as to suggest that the latter station a naval squadron at Chemulpo.4
In a sense it is possible to state that the then-eviden
need for a more forward policy in Korea had alreedy been anticipated by Witte.

That his attitude may have undergone a change in

the months of December and January is indicated by the minutes 01

2

Brown, Masterx

3

Bishv~,

Korea

~ ~

~

!!!

!!£

East, 142.

~eighbors,

456.

4 Romanov, Rosslya v Manchzhurli, 155, citing telegram
of Alexeiev to Witte, fi'6rufu.,.-la, 1897.
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a meeting of the Board of Governors of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company held on ~ebru8ry 3, 1897.°

Having already realized

the desired contract for the MQnchurian line from China, and disturbed by foreign railway concessions in Korea, Witte proposed
at that time that Russia inst1tute pressure by way of requiring
Korea. to refuse all subsequent

~ontracts

to fore1gn oompan1es as

.ell as to change all existing lines to conform to the Russian
broad gauge. S
Finally, on Ma.y 21, 1897, Witte gave h1s consent to the
appointment of a Russian f1nancial adviser to be attached to the
Korean court. 7

His choice for the post was Kir Alexeiev of the

Russian Customs Service, whose task it thereby became to effect,
carefully but steadily, the transfer of the Korean customs administration into Russian hands.

Alexeiev's persuasive powers were

auch that within two months of his arrival early in October a new
and thoroughly pro-Russian cabinet was enstated, and the existing
head of the Korean Customs Service, J. McLeavy Brown, an Englishman, was ordered dismissed. 8

The office of "Resident" in charge

5 Minutes c1 ted in ibid., 164. The Board of Governorl
was formed on December 27, 1896, and its first meeting was held
on January 21 of the follow1ng' year.
6
'1

Ibid.
-Ibid.,

-

165.

8 Brown refused to accept his dismissal on the ground
that h1s term of office had not yet expired, and the matter re-
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of finance was" conferred upon Alexeiev on November 5, at which
time Korea agreed that it would apply only to Russia for financial assistance in the fUture. 9
Further signalizing this departure from the previous
policy of ron-interference in Korea was the appointment, also in
September, 1897, of Alexis de
and

general~y

Sp~yer

to succeed the mild-mannered

well-liked Waeber as RUBsian Minister in Korea.

From the time of his arrival in Seoul, Speyer let it be known
that he had been sent to impart a new vigor to Russia's Korean
policy_

His conduct of Russian affairs, quite devoid of the con-

ciliatory policy of his predecessor, was to lOBe for Russia many
of the advantages which had already been secured.

or

this we

shall have more to say later.
In the cl. osing months of 1897 the international status
of Korea underwent a profound and rather significant change.
October

l2~

On

the King of Korea ascended the "Altar of Heaven" and

there assumed the title of Emperor. 10

Two days later Korea

mained unsettled until the Russian advisers were withdrawn in
1898. Cf. Nelson, Korea ~ ~ Old Orders, 234-240.
9

Romanov, Rossiya

~

Manchzhurii, 178.

10 This move was urged upon the King by the so-called
"Independence Club" organized in June of 1896 by a Korean, at
that time an American citizen, Dr. Phillip Jaisohn. This organization published a newspaper, The Independent, the first issue
of which was printed on April ~8§6. X memorial of the Independence Club, urging that the King take the step of becoming
Emperor, appears in The Korean RepoBito£l, Volume IV, 1897, Seou~
387-388. The Imperiar-Ealct upon the assumption of the title
Emperor is quoted in ~., 388-390.
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dropped her ofl'icial name of Chao-hsien or Chosen, which had obtained since 1392, and became the Empire of Dai Han.

As early

as 1895 such a step had been contemplated and at that time had
been sponsored by the Japanese, who were then in control of the
peninsula.

Russia, which on the earlier occasion had strenuously

opposed the move, now lent every ,measure of support, presumably
to further the illusion of Korean independence, and at the same
time to strengthen her position as Koreats "protector" at the
expense of Japanese pretensions which were momentarily in abeyance. ll

Within a relatively short period Korea was recognized by

the treaty powers as an Empire, and assumed a position of equality in the Far East with China and Japan.
However, this assertion of Korea's independence ot foreign suzerainty did not seriously deter Russia's designse

The

success which had attended Alexeiev's initial efforts caused
Witte to reconsider the long-delayed creation of a Russo-Korean
Bank.

The advantages of such an institution were outlined to

Wi tte by his Assistant Minister of i'inance, .p. M. RomBnov:
It is my conviction that Korea has paramount importance tor us; Northern Manchuria is of importance only
insofar as it affords us access either to Liaotung or
to Korea. However, at this time the, Chinese would hardly allOW us to reach by railway one of the ports of the
Liaotung Peninsula, since they understand that this would
place Peking completely at our mercy; on the other hand,
they would not oppose very strenuously the leading of a .
11 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 235. On the Independence Club, cf. Hulbert, The Passiaa ~ Korea, 150-157.
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railway from Bodun through Kirin to one or other of the
Korean ports, inasmuch as this would protect them from
any seizure of Korea by the Japanese. In order that we
may obtain such permission from Korea it first becomes
necessary to secure influence in her financial affairs,
in which connection we need not avoid financial sacrifices, since our investment will be rerurned a hundredfold in the not too distant future •••• 2
It would seem that Romanov's argument was sufficiently persuasive
for on October 28, Wi tte at last approved the foundation of the
Russo-Korean Bank.

That suoh an institution is not to be consid-

ered an innocent humanitarian undertaking on the part of the Russian government; but rather as another pliable instrument fashioned by Witte in his program of F'ar Eastern expansion, is clear
from the above-quoted words of Romanov.

Interestingly enough,

the board of directors of the newly created bank was virtually
identical with that of the Russo-Chinese Bank established in
Deoember of 1895. 13
It is fitting that we here introduce into these pages
the name of one Mikhail Muraviev who, in the post of Minister ot
F'oreign Affairs, was shortly to become the most outspoken opponent of the then omnipotent Minister of Finance, Witte.
Lobanov had passed away in August of 1896.

Prince

The following Janu-

ar,:, Muravlev, by virtue of his p"'lrsoNl1 acqilalntance with the
Tsar, andparticu1arly with the Empress Dowager, was recalled

12

Letter

Maroh 20, 1897, quoted by Romanov, Rossila

13

§\aP£I, 96-97.

~ Manchzhuril, 157-158.
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from his relatively obscure post as Russian Minister in Copenhagen to become Aoting Minister of Foreign Affairs; in April of
the same year Muraviev was appointed Foreign Minister.

The son

of Nicholas Muravlev-Amurskl, whose name has already been mentioned in connection with the hussian acquisi~ion of the Amur
territory ana Vladivostok in 1860, Mikhail Muraviev was, as will
be seen, a considerably more forceful personality than his predecessor, Lobanov.

Described by his contemporaries as a "fast

liver" and an "ignoramus," Muraviev was, nevertheless, reluctant
to be merely a tool in the hands of Witte,
had little sympathy.14

fo~

whose policies he

Consequently, when, after Germany's well-

timed seizure of Kiao-chow in November of 1897, the choice of a
suitable Russian policy again presented itselt, the discussion
found Witte and Muraviev on opposite sides of the fence.
Before prooeeding to a consideration of the Kiao-chow
and Port Arthur "incidents" however, passing notice should be
paid to the si ~uation which gave rise to the first expression ot
personal antagonism between the two men.

In the spring of 1897,

Witte had decided to parallel his I'8':1ised KOl'eflln policy with an
attempt to exact still further

r~t1way

concessions from China.

Accordingly, in May of that year he dispatched to Peking the ubi-

14 The tone of most of the contemporary estimates was
in general tlui te ori tical. Cf. Rosen, Forty Years .2.! Diplomacy,
I, 102; Hayashi, Secret Memoirs, 105-106; Alexander Isvolsky,
Recollections 2.! .!l Foreign MInIster, New York, 1921, 119.
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quitous Prince Esper Ukhtomsky.16

Ostensibly the purpose ot

Ukhtomsky's visit was to distribute certain "gifts" to the Chines
officialdom--notably the first installment of the bribe to Li
Hung-Chang.

Underlying this. however, Ukhtomsky was instructed

by Witte to inquire into the possibility of acquiring rights for
an extension of the Chinese Eastern to a port in Korea, as well
as for a branch line running south to the Yellow 8ea. 16
Actually, Ukhtomsky'8 mtssion bore little fruit.

Li

refused categoricelly to con.;;.idEU' any further concessions and
pOintedly charact6r1zed

Russiat~

expense with the words:
you want to enter with
wives and children."17

eonstant encroachments at China'.

"We have let you in the yard, and now
t'.S

into the very room where we keep our

Tbe only point to which he lDuld agree

was that no concession for joining the Russian and Chinese lines
would be granted to any other power. 1S

When, in mid-August,

Muraviev finally learned trom his personal agents in Peking the
real purpose of Ukhtomsky's visit, he launched into a violent

16

Ukhtomsky's mission had originated in the February

3 meeting of the Chinese Eastern Railway Board of Directors, and

is described in detail by Romanov, Rossila
172.

~

Manchzhurii, 162-

16 These secret instructions were cleared through Tsal'
Nicholas, but were concealed trom Muraviev, ibid., 168-169.

-

17 Telegram, Pokotiloy to Witte, May 27, l897, quoted
in ibid., 171.

-

18

~.,

172-173.
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tirade against Witte, critlcizing ?he latter's move as one calculated to provoke China and push her into the waiting ar.ms ot
Great Britain.

Witte's judgment in employing a known expansion-

ist to negotlate behind the back of Russia's legitimate

diplomat~

representatives, as well as his constant and repeated interference in the conduot of Russlan foreign policy, were seriously
questioned by Muravlev, who was soon to take revenge for these
invasions of his diplomatic domain. 1g
The failure of Ukhtomsky's mission to seoure from China
rights to construct a railway to the Yellow Sea paved the way for
Muraviev's action in the occupation and lease of Port Arthur, a
~ove

1897.

inspired by the German occupation of Kiao-chow in November,
With this, Rassia was once again confronted with a choice

of alternative polieiesl

whether to oppose the German oocupation

of Kiao-ohowor to acquiesoe and seek compensation for herself
elsewhere.

The ensuing debate presents a striking parall.l to

the controversy occasioned by Japan's defeat of China some two
and a half years earlier.

In both lnstances,--Shimonoseki and

Kiao-chow--Witte championed a policy whioh insisted that China
remain unparti tioned; in both, cat'es

1~he

Finance Mini ster was

opposed by a Foreign Minister who advooated concesaion and compensation.

..

The differenee between the two policy debates was, aa

19

in.!lli., 172.

Letter, Muraviev to Witte, August 18, 1897, cited
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shall be seen, in their outcome:

in the case of Shimonoseki,

Witte's will had triumphed over that of Lobanovl in the question
of Kiao-chow, Muraviev was to emerge the victor.
The siezures of Kiao-chow by Germany and Port Arthur by
Russia present themselves as an interrelated episode .. the full
details andmnsequenoes of which it is impossible .. and indeed
qui te needless to enter into here, exoept to establish the relation between Russia's decision to occupy Port Arthur and the eveft
tual abandonment of Witte's policy of "peaceful penetration."

It

is clear that the motives underlying the German action may be
traced back to her partiCipation in the three-power intervention
of 1895.

We have already cited the Kaiser's letter to his

cousi~

the Tsar .. in which he first broached the question of a Far Easterr
port for Germany, suggesting that, " ••• you will kindly aee to it
that Germany may alao be able to acquire a Port somewhere where
it does not 'gene' you. ftSO

Indeed, this would ~ee.m to have been

one ot the major considerations in view of which the Kaiser agree(
to take part in the intervention.

In the ensuing years Germany's

search for a place in the Asiatic sun had narrowed down to Kiaochow, a Chinese port situated at the threshold of the rich Shantung province.

Disoounting a prior Russian claim to Kiao·chow,

the Kaiser bided his time until a convenient opportunity to

20

Supra, 79.

acoo~
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pl18h the selzure might present itself. 21

The murder of two Ger-

man Catholicmlssionaries ln Shantung on November 1, 1897, provided William with the desir.ed pretext; the German Far Eastern squae..
ron was dispatched immediately upon receipt of the news, and by
November 14 was anchored in Kiao-chow Bay.22
Before this fortunate .opportuni ty ot obtalning Kiao-chOl
by means of warships rather than by resorting to the more tenuoua
processes of diplomacy presented itself, however, the Kaiser in a
visit to St. Petersburg in August of 1897 had personally inquired
of the Tsar whether Russia would object were Germany to occupy
Kiao-chow.

The popular interpretation of this so-called Peterhot

eonference is that "Willy" tricked "Nicky" into approving such a
move, and that he in turn had given Russia the go-ahead to occupy
Port Arthur. 23

In view of Russiats subsequent opposition and re-

sistance to the move, it would seem that however ambiguous may
have been the Tsar's answer to the Kaiser's inquiry, Russia did

-

not write oft Kiao-chow to Germany until faced with the fiat
21 This alleged Russian claim to Kiao-chow took the
form of a priority on the port in the event that it were to be
alienated to another power. It was, however, but an expansion ot
a temporary concession granted by China for tha use of Kiao-chow
as a winter anchorage for the Russian fleet in the years 1~95-18~
and was ~robably based on the spurious "Cassini Convention ot
1895. or. Langer, Diplomacl ~ Imperialism, 450-452.
22 Ibid., 449-454.

-

23 This is the version of Witte in his MemOirs, 98-10~
Substantially the same version is presented by Witte's friend and
apologist, Mr. -E. J. Dillon, ~...!. Eclipse .2! Russia, New York,
1918, 245 ft.

.....- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - , ---'
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accompli of a German war fleet in possession of Kiao-chow Bay.
Upon hearing of Genaany's intentions. Muraviev, who had not previously been consulted by Nicholas, was irate and protested vehemently to the German F'oreign Otfice. 24

However, ,his intention

forcibly to resist such a German move was undermined by the
al, on November 16, of news of
er.

th~

arr1~

German seizure two days earli-

Accord1ngly, plans to disps tch a Russian fleet to the trouble

zone were abandoned in favor of the alternate solution--compenaation.

Then and only then did Russia turn northward to Port Ar-

thur. 25
Within a week of the announcement of the German seizure
of Kiao-chow, Muraviev had submitted to the TSGr a rather lengthy
memorandum in which he called for a complete and radical volte
in the course of Russian policy_ He suggested that. by way
-offacecompensating
herself, Russia might occupy either Port Arthur
or Tali.nwan, both ports in the Liaotung Peninsula, as a po1nt ot
leverage toward Korea and a gateway to Manchuria.

Employ1ng

Germany's actions as a pretext, Murav1ev reasoned, it would be
easy to justify the occupation to China on the ground that a
strong base for the Russian fleet was a virtual necessity should

24 The notes of Murav1ev, dated November 8 and 9, were
described as diplomatic "bombshells," and for about ten days to
two weeks thereafter it seemed as though war was imminent. Cf.
Langer, Dielomacf ~ I~perlalism, 452-453.
25

-

Ibid., 457.
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events take a course harmful to China. 26

On November 26, the

Tsar summoned his ministers to discuss the Muraviev memorandum
and himself presided at the de11berations.

Px-esent on this occa-

sion were MuravIev, WItte, War Minister Vannovsky, and Naval
M1nister

Tyrtov~

Muraviev repeated h1s argument to the assembled

ministers and added that circumstances
now favored such act1on •
.
In favor of Muraviev's proposal were three members of the conference--h1mself, Tsar N1cholas, and Vannovsky, opposed was a minority of two--Witte and Tyrtov. 27
The most outspoken opponent of the move was, of course,
Witte.

He rem1nded the ministers that any occupation of a Chine_

port would const1tute a violation of the spirit of the Moscow
Protocol of 1896.

By the terms of this treaty, in the event that

Japan infringed upon the terr1torial integrity of either China or
Korea, Russia was obliged to come to China's aid.

The occupation

of either Talienwan or Port Arthur, argued W1tte, would place
Russia 1n the anomalous posit1on of doing the very thing she had
comm1 tted herself to prevent others from doing.

Besides setting

an extremely dangerous precedent, such a move would be unfeasible
from the standpoint of national selt-interest because it might
endanger the construction of the Manchurian railway.

26 Romanov, Rossiia v Manchzhurii, 186-188.
Langer, DiPlomacl ~ ImperIa 18m, 4S1-45a.
27

Witte, MemOirs, 99-100.

Implicit in

Cf. also
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Wltte's thinking was the fact that he hlmself had moves under wa7,
which, if successfUl, stood to gain infinitely more for Russia
than the rash grabbing-off of Port Arthur.

Consequently, argued

Wltte, Russia should not emulate Germany, but rather should do
everything in her power to force Germany to withdraw from Klaochow.

Admiral Tyrtov also opposed the move, but from consldera-

tions different from those suggested by Witte.

Speaklng from the

naval point of vlew, he declared both Port Arthur and Talienwan
to be inadequate a8 compared with certain of the Korean porta.
Therefore, accordlng to Tyrtov, the best thing would be to get
along with Vladivostok for the time being in the hope of ultimat.
ly acqulring a port in Korea. 28
Muraviev replied to these objections with the rather
pointless argument that Rus*ia was obligated to China only in the
event of an attack by Japan.

Witte countered with the prophetlc

assertlon that any such action on the part of
ineVitably lead to war with Japan.

~18sia

would almost

His argument evidently carriec

some weight since the Tsar, though himself completely converted
to Muraviev's vlewpoint, temporarily shelved the plan to occupy
Port Arthur. 29
28 Curiously enough, the Tsar, in his conference with
the Kaiser in August, had expressed a decided preference for the
port of Ping-yang on the northwest coast of Korea. Russian naval
authorities, on the other hand, seem to have preferred Massampo.
Langer, Diplomacy ~ Imperialism, 456, citing B1! Grosse Politik,
XIV, no. 3663.
M.moir8,108~
Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 18S-l89, Witte,

121

Here the personal equation comes increasingly into evidence ss a determinlng factor in the formatlon of Russia's Far
Eastern polley.

The clash of personali ties between W1 tte and Mu-

rav1evhad, as has already been suggested, developed'lnto a personal struggle for advantage wh1oh, ,though 1t stemmed from legitimate d1fferences of op1nion, stemmed also from Murav1ev t s resolw
to oonduct his own foreign policy, exclusive of W1tte's 1nterferenoe.

!tor his own part, Wi tte, after almost s1x years as virtual

d1ctator of Russian Far Eastern policy, could not succeed 1n
cll1ng h1mself' to this rad1cal 1des"ot Muravievt

re~

Even after the

November 26 conference of m1n1sters 1t appeared that W1tte's will
had triumphed aga1n.

However,

th1~

vi~tory

compensation was extremely short-11ved.

over Murav1ev and

The outcome is best de-

scribed 1n Witte's own words, in which he recalls an interview
with the Tsar "several days" after the November 26 conference:
•••• '~ou know, Sergey Yulievitch, 1 sa1d the Emperor to
me, evidently aomewhat put out, I have decided to 00cupy Port Arthur and Ta-11eng-wan. Our ships with
troops are already on the1r way there. Here is why I
have taken th1s step. After the conference the F'ore1gn
M1nister reported to me that, aecording to his information, Br1tish warships were cruising off the ports in
quest1on, and that if we d1d not oocupy them, the English would do so.'3O
Moraviev had apparently concocted this Itory bY' way of scaring the
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Tsar into aetloa. 3l

Thus, he had taken his revenge upon WItte

tor the latter's invasion of the dlplomatic domain in sending
Ukhtomsky to China the previous summer.

However, in so dOing

Muraviev set in motion a course of events which was to have ser10us and far-reaching consequences tor Russia.
In this 8ituation, Witte made one last futile attempt
to forestall the oocupation of Port Arthur.

In his Memoirs,

Witte relates that direotly from his interview with. the Tsar, he
approaohed Tschirsky, the German Cbarge at st. Petersburs, and
asked him to wire William II "to withdraw trom Kiao-chow, atter
having punished those guilty of the assassination of the mission~o

arles."32
as follows:

this personal plea the Kaiser replied, in effect,
"I see from Witte's words that 80me very important

details relating to the matter are unknown to h1m.
cannot follow his advioe."!!
in

80

Just what

Wi~te

Therefore ••

hoped to accomplish

going over the head of the Tsar remains open to question.

In any event, his rash act was, tbanks to MuravIev's ever-alert
intellIgence agents, shortly made known to Nicholas,and thenceforward there is discernable a marked coolness in the theretofore

31 Witte adds that, "Muravlev's information was •••
false, as I later found out from the British Ambassador." ~ •.
32

-

Ibid., 101.

33 Ibid. The "Important details" referred to by
Wil11am ev1den~had to do w1th certain secret aspects of the
Peterhof conferenoe, or at least with the Kaiser's interpretation
of Nicholas' reaotion.
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cordial relations between the Tsar and his Finance Minister.
There can be little doubt that this overstepping of his authority
was in large measure responsible for W1tte's subsequent fall from
grace, as the Tsar sought increasingly to assert himselt in foreign affairs and to throw off Witte's influence.
PreCisely what Russia stood to gain in the F.r East had
she adhered to W1tte l a long-range program instead ot embarking
upon Muraviev's precipitate adventure presents an interest1ng
problem to the historian.

It will be recalled that throughout

the summer of 1897 Witte had been engaged in seeking for Russia
an ice. free port on the Yellow 8ea.

It was this very assignment

which Ukhtamsky had bungled and which had occasioned the first
antagonism between Witte and Muraviev.

Witte's hopes for success

were revived somewhat when, in June, Li Hung-Chang approached him
for a loan to China.

If he could condition the loan upon hi.

previous demands, Witte stood to gain "the most substantial adva~tages for Russia."34

The chances of realizing these advan-

tages increased with Ger.aany 1 s seizure ot Kiao-chow, for then
Witte could command a dear price indeed for the loan and a promise of Russian aid against German enoroaohment.

Again in Decem-

ber of 1897, Li repeated his request; this time Witte enumerated
his conditions:

by

(1) a railroad and industrial monopoly through-

34 Telegram, W1tte to Ukhtomskf, June 13, 1897, oited
Romanov, Rossiza ~ Manchzhur1i, 192.

,

'
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out all Manchuria and Mongolia; (2) the issue of a concession to
the Chinese Eastern for a branch line south to the China Sea, and
(3) permission for Russia to construct there a port with the
right of acceas to all ships flying the

~ls~l~n

flag. 36

Whether

or not Li could have acce};.;'ued these condi tiona it is needless to
to speculate.

However, in view ot the possibility of obtaining

these demands it is not in the least surprising that Witte should
so strenuously have opposed the occupation of Port Arthur.
On December 23, Russia began the process of self-compen
sation by dispatching a telegram to Peking disavowing all intentions ot territorial acquisition, and .ssuring the Chinese govern
ment that Ruesia would withdraw from Port Arthur and Talienwan
tlas soon ae political conditions and the interests of Russia and
China permit doing so~36
set:

With this the stage for the seizure was

a few days later a Russian squadron entered the harbor ot

Port Arthur and ran up the Russian fl-St

Newa of the Russian

seizure was joyously received at Berlin where the move was rightly interpreted, as cons'tituting acquiescence to Germanyt. seizure
of Kiao-chow.

Sri tain, !i;ranee, and Japan took a somewhat dimmer

view of the Situation, eaoh realizing that the previously existing balance ot power in the

~ar

East had been broken.

According-

35 Telegram, Witte to Pokotilov, December 16, 1897,
cited in ibid., 192-193.

-

36

-

Quot.d in ibid., 196.

,

,
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11, Britaln, discarding her more-or-less traditional polioy ot
uphol~ing

China i s territorial integrity, got into the act by

ing Wei-hai-wei; F'rance, likewis., seized Kwang-chow ..wan. '67

sel~

Thua,

instead of preserving China from outward aggre8sion, the action
•

of Gennany and Russia proved to be the first step towards the
foreign invasion of Chinese terr!tory.
world seemed to awaken to the danger.

At one moment the Manchu
This was, however, but a

flash of lightning on an already darkened horizon.
All of these cases of seizure and occupation later took
the legal form of "lease of territory," a concept very similar to
that embodied in the Russian lease of &anchurian territory for
the Siberian railway.'68

Chinese sovereignty was nominally main-

tained and respected, but the locar' administration was gtve1'1 over
entirely into the hands of the occupying for.ig}:l powers.

The

convention arranging for the "lease" of Port Arthur" to aussia tor
twenty-five years was signed in PekIng on March 27, 1898, and an
additional agreement, defining the boundaries of the leased territory, on May 7, 1898~9By this understanding the technical sover-

37 Important background material on the British and
French seizures is provided by Langer, Diplomacl ~ Imperialism,
473-476.

Agreements

38

Supra, 100-102.

39

For the text of this convention see Treaties and
-

.!.!l!! !.!!£ concerning China, I, 119-121. •
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eignty of China was explicitly recognized, as well as the allegiance of Chinese subjects, but Russia aoquired all governmental
rights, being allowed to establish her own oourts and otherwise
given a free hand in matters involving law and administration.
Although Port Arthur marks the first major defeat suatained by Witte in the realm of j'ar Eastern diplomacy and the beginning of the end for his polley of "peaoeful penetration," it
by no means terminated his usefulness to the cause of 'l'sariat expansion.

Both Nicholas and Muraviev reoognized Witte's value

when confronted with the problem of overcoming China's resistanoe
to the. "leasing" of Port Arthur.

Aocordingly, Witte's talents

were enlisted to negotiate for the desired .. leas ....'O
come of Witte's negotiations
ceding paragraph.

WAS

The out-

the treaty described in the pre-

The means by which the task was accomplished,

however, recall Witte's dealings with Li in May and June of 1896.
Again he had recourse to bribery, a tactic which this time he
candidly admits, arguing that it was the only way in which bloodshed could be averted. 4l

In this way Witte contributed to the

consolidation of gains won in consequence of a policy which he

40 It would seem that, in agreeing to undertake the
task, Witte was compromising his principles. This charge is som.
what mitigated by the fact that Muraviev had decided to push
Witte's loan conditions upon China. Cf. Romanov, Rossila ~ MancD
zhUl'li, 198.. 199.
41 Memoirs, 103-104. Details of the bribe are to be
found in Romanov, Rossila ~ Manch~hurii, 198-199.
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had opposed, '"a task which must have salved his pride somewhat
even though it did not necessarily restore him to his former confidence in the councils of the Tsar.

In any event, this would

suggest that Witte was not so much opposed to Russia's occupation
of Port Arthur as to the method of seizure sponsored by Nicholas
and Muraviev.
To return to Korea, it will be recalled that, on the
eve of Kiao-chow and Port Arthur, Witte, after long and serious
consideration, had consented to a more forward policy, which was
to take the form of a Russo-Korean Bank.

Alexeiev had been sent

to Korea as financial adviser to the royal court, and a new Russian Minister in Seoul had been apPOinted in the person of Alexis
de Speyer.

Thus, after momentary setbacks in the early months ot

1897, Russian influence was once again definitely in the ascendancy.

However, in Korea, as at Port Arthur, Witte's position was

shortly to be compromised and rendered untenable by a combination
of considerations, not the least of which was the belligerent attitude assumed by the new Minister, M. de Speyer.
Perhaps the most notable instance in which de Speyer
exoeeded his authority was the so-called "Deer Island episode."42
In August of 1897, Speyer's predecessor, Waeber, had marked off
42 For accounts of this inCident, cf. Nelson, Korea
and the Old Orders, 237-240; Korean Repository, V (1898), i11-116;
HayashI,-sicret Memoirs, 93-97.
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some twenty acres of the small island in Fusan harbor as a possible looation for a Russian coaling station, notWithstanding the
fact that the same tract had some two years earlier been demarked
by Mr. Mc Leavy Brown as a site for a general foreign colon1_

In

F'ebruary and March of 1898 Speyer decided, apparently on his own
authority, to press the

Russia~

claim.

This he presented to the

Korean government in the form of an ultimatum threatening that,
if the Russian demands were not met within a specified time, Ruasia would withdraw its m1litary and financ1al adviaers. 43

In the

long run Speyer's bullying tactiCS, as ill-tempered as they were
ill-advised, accomplished nothing save to focus Korean resentment
against Russ1a's peremptory methods and to arouse general susp1c10n as to her objects.

Backed by the Japanese Minister, Mr. Katcl

the Korean King took full advantage of this opportunity to rid
himself of overbearing Russian influence.
her past aid, he expla1ned:

Thanking Russia for

ftYour officials have accomplished

their work and it is convenient for us to have them relieved from
our service.

I feel grateful to you for suggesting the idea of
relieving these officials. ft44 Thus, as Nelson observes, de Spey-

43
Korea

~ ~

44

The text of Speyer's ultimatum is quoted by Nelson,

.Q!.!! Orders, 238, citing. Korean Reposl torz, V, 113.

-

Q.uoted ibid., 239.
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er was made fta viotim of his own designe. ft45

In this situation

Russia could do nothing but back ignominiously out of Korea.
Speyer was recalled, the Russo-Korean Bank closed its doors which
had been open for only

thre~

months, the Russian militar,y experts

were sent to Port Arthur and the .financial advisers were reasAtmw'
- .......
to the legation at Tokyo.46
More or less contemporaneQusly with these untoward developments Russia and Japan were negotiating intermittently among
themselves to clarify their respective positions with reference
to Korea,

Actually, these efforts had antedated the Russian de-

bacle by several months, having originated in a

p~otest

against

Alexeiev's activities in Seoul •. In February, 1898, Japan proposed a joint Russo-Japanese interference in Korea, Russia to
supply Korea with military instructors, Japan to replace Alexeiev
wi th a financial adviser of its own choice .47

This proposal

Witte dismissed as detrimental to Russiats prestige in Asia.
Japan, however, persisted and, after Russia's withdrawal from
Seoul in April, was emboldened to request that Russia write ott
Korea entirely, in return for a like Japanese promise to· stay out

45
46
47

-Ibid.
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Romanov, Rossila

~

Manchzhurli, 179.

130
of Manchuria. 48

This proposal Russia likewise turned down, al-

though from it was to evolve the well-known Nissi-Rosen Protocol.
This agreement, concluded on April 25, 1898, carried
many of the same provisions as the ineffectual Lobanov-Yamagata
Protocol of 1896. 49
~he

upper hand.

This time, however, it was Japan which held

According to

t~e

terms of the agreement, both

parties pledged themselves to recognize the full sovereignty and
independence of Korea, and "to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country," except by common
agreement and mutual consent. 50

Russia was forced to recognize

the "wide development taken by the commercial and industrial enterprise of Japan 1n Korea," and agreed "in no way to obstruct
the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and

Korea.~

Here the personal antagonism between Witte and Muraviev
comes once again into focus.

Wi th his plans for the "leasing" ot

Port Arthur well on their way to realization, Muraviev began to
perceive the need for conciliating Japan.

His hopes for effeot-

ing such a conciliation he placed in Korea, reasoning apparently
i,

48
~ ~

.

;

Rosen, F'ortl Years .£! Diplomacy, 179.

49 Text of the Nissi-Rosen Agreement in Korea:
Asreements, 24-25.
50

-Ibid.
Ibid.

Trea~

51
For background information on tbe treaty.
cf. Rosen, Forti'!ears £f Diplomacy, I, 157-160.
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that once Russia had obtained Port Arthur she would have no further need of Korea.

In other words, Korea was expendable and

should be written off as a concession to Japan. 52

Muravievfs ex-

pediency once again triumphed over Witte's objections when Russia
pulled up stakes in Korea in April.
trating on consolidating her

new~y

Thenceforth, Russia, concenwon gains in Manchuria, would

be forced to relinquish, for the time being, dominance in Korea
to Japan. 53
However, Russian interest in Korea, though checked
momentarily by the counterpressure of Japan· and the disinclination of Muraviev to jeopardize rela tiona wi th Japan and Great
Britain, was far from.being extinguished.

The idea of obtaining

a port in Korea had become so fixed in the official Russian mind
that even Muraviev's steadfast opposition could not quite dispel
the hope that in the not too distant future Russia might have
such a port to herself.

In 1899 the Russian Ministry of Marine,

arguing the inadequacies of Port Arthur as a base for the Pacifio
fleet, turned tts h'1l".gry eye8 toward the 80uth Korean port of
Ma8sampo, an excellent harbor which also provided a complete 8tra

52 Letter of Muraviev to Witte, December 11, 1897,
cited by Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 179.
53 At the same time, however, RU8sia tried to keep a
hand in Korean internal affairs through its new representative.
1n Seoul, M. Pavlov. Cf. Hulbert, !B! Passigg £! Korea, la9.
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egio oommand 01' TsushiMa Strait. 54

This demand for

Massampo~cul ..

minated, in Maroh of 1900, in an agreement whereby Russia received
the r1ght to bu1ld at Massampo a coaling atat10n and naval hospital in return for a promia6 not to seek further conoessions. 65
This concession at Massampo served merely to whet the
Russian appetite.

Throughout

th~

early years of the twentieth

oentury, indeed up to the very outbreak of the Russo-Japanese
Russia continued, 1n direct viola tion of the

Wa~

above"1"1ent~ ~n'3d

agreement to press for further advantages and conoessions in the
. peninsula.

In April, 1901, Russia secured from the Korean Emper-

or a non-alienation guarantee whereby the latter promised not to
grant any mining concessions to foreigners and to lease his own
personal mines only to Russians if foreigners were to operate
the~.

At the same time it was agreed that Russia would be called

upon to furnish any foreign capital borrowed for the construction
of the projected Seoul-Wiju railway.56
Further indication of a more aggressive Russian policy
was provided on April 13, 1903, when Russia notified Korea of her
intention to exeroise the option of cutting blmber in the Ya1u

54

Brown, Mastetl £!

55
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Valley, as provided in the Russo-Korean Agreement of April,
l8ge. 57

Since the agreement had stipulated that the Russian in-

terpretation was to prevail in all disputes relating to the concession, Korean and Japanese protests were of no avail.

Further-

more, Rusgia interpreted the word "valleyb in its broadest sense,
which is to say, as embracing the territory drained not only by
the Yalu River itself, but all its tributaries as well.
whole enterprise assumed an unmistakably

The

military-st~teiic

as·

pectwhen Russia proceeded to construct forts to protect the territory, sent "frontier guards" to patrol it, and selected the
port of Yongampo, near the mouth of the Yalu, as a shipping port
for the timber that was cut.

At Yongampo the Russians erected

several large "warehouses" which later turned out not to be warehouses at all but barracks and stables.

These Russian "lumbering

activities in the Yalu basin did much to intensify the already
existing strain between Russia and Japan, and must be counted
among the major causes ot the Russo-Japanese War.
By the time the anti· foreign Boxer disturbances had

b~

ken out in China in 1900, it had become perfectly clear to many
well-informed observers that Russian Far Eastern policy was no
longer as univocal as had previously been supposed.

In June of

that year .Muraviev had died, and was succeeded as head of the Rus-

57 Ibid., 142. The original five ..year option had been
extended to twenty years on January 1, 1901.

, "
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sian Foreign Otflce by the more conservative and c1rcumspect
Lamsdorff, who was later to become Witte's staunchest supporter
in his flnal hour.

Witte's chief opponent at this tlme was the

new Minister of War, General Kuropatkin.

As Wittefs long regime

neared its close, the position of predominant influence in the
Tsar's confidences and

~

facto control over foreign policy was

assumed by a group of militarists, 'eourtiers, and adventurers
headed by a retired army officer and state councillor, Ivan Sezobrazov.

Known also as the "Koreans," this is the

g~up

which

championed the Yalu timber eoncessions as a blind for a more forward policy in Korea, and whose actlvities were responSible, in
large measure, for Witte's final downfall.
Bemobrazov and his followers 8aw in the Yalu timber co
cessions a convenient jumping-off point for a future invasion ot
Korea.

As their plans unfolded, a bogus private company would be

created for the ostensible PQrpose of operating the timber
cesslons.

con~

Actually, the "lumberjacks" would be soldiers ln dls-

gulse who, at the propitious moment, would strike out and invade
the peninsula .58

This crack-brained scheme was favorably regard-

ed in high governmental circles and apparently had received the
approval or the trlar himself.

IIbe

only stumbling-block in the

path of the desired company was Wltte, who 8ucce8stul17 countered

58 Romanov, Rossila
Witte, Memolrs, 116-117.

~

Manchzhurii, 386-388: cf. also

, '
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all the initiaimoves to realize its creation.

At last, however,

Witte's opposition was broken through and, on July 1, 1901, the
East Asiatic Development Company was established. 59

From this

time on Russia slowly but surely courted disaster in the Far
East.
The final seal was set

~pon

Witte's defeat when, in

August, 1902, he was relieved of his ministry and elevated to the
innocuous and purely ornamental position of President of the Committee of Ministers.

At approximately the same time as his po-

litical powers was reneered nugatory, his control of economic
development in Manchuria was also broken through.

In the now-

impending crisis a one-dimensional m1litary policy would lead
Russia to throw all caution to the winds.

Thenceforward, as

Langer remarks, "Russian policy was being made by the soldiersWho
had won over the Tsar. and who were, before long to March him
straight into the disastrous confliot with Japan."60

~
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Imperialism, as a concept of expansion, has carried
various connotations in different periods of history.
torians agree, however, in seeing it as one of

~he

All his-

dominant fea-

tures of the period between the Congress of Berlin and the outbreak of World War I.

Though nineteenth centruy imperialism was

a protean institution which assumed many different shapes and
forms, it can be in no way divorced from the political economy
ushered in by the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries.

The extension of terrItory over-

seas, extension of capital investments abroad, ever-increasing
competition for overseas markets and control of supplies,--all
these factors combined to impart a distinctive character to this
"new imperialism."
Russian "imperialism" under both the Tsarist and Communist regime has frequently been denounced.

Rarely has it been

praised; even more rarely has it been defined.

To be sure, Rus-

sian imperialism would seem more difficult of definition than ot
condemnation.

One reason for this difficulty lies in the fact

that from the time, beginning in the 1450's of the final unifica1M

,,

137

...

tion of the principalities of Greater Russia around a single cornerstone of power,--Moscow.-the Moscovite state itself was oonstantly expanding. l

Russian history has been the epic of build-

ing a vast empire by penetrating thinly settled regions and either destroying or assimilating the sparse native populations.
The road of Amerlcan
rlvers~

empire-buil~ing

moved westward--over praiae.

mountains, unt'11 it finally reached· the Pacific.

The

Russian frontier moved gradually eastward until it too reached
the Pacific and at one time overflowed onto the American continent. 2

"Russian history," writes the Russian historian George

Vernadsky, "is the history of the expansion over a vast continent
of a vigorous people imbued wi th the pioneer spiri t."3
point, the student is prompted to

inquire~

At what

can "expansion" be

said to end and "imperialism" to begin?
A fu.rther difficulty of definition derives from the
fact that Russian "imperialism" was, at one and the same time,
similar to and different from imperialism as conceived and practiced by the nations of Western Europe and the United States.
RUssia was Similar, for example, in her efforts to extend her

~erioan

1 Philip E. Mosely, "Aspects of Russian Expansion,"
Slavic Review, VII, 1948, 197.

2 In addition to Alaska which was sold to the United
States in 1867, the Russians also maintained Fort Ross approximately 60 miles north of San Francisco until the early 1810 f s.
3
1936, 4.
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'" East, where before 1890 she had made no subsway in the Far

stantial progress since her, acquisition of the Amur region with
Vladivostok in 1860.

She was different in that the Russian Em-

pire, like its Chinese neighbor, was territorially compact. Perhaps even more significant, however, is the fact that Tsarist
Russia was both a colonial power,and, as Lenin contemptuously
styled her, a semi-colonial adjunct of Western European financecapitalism.'
These perfunctory and admittedly very general observations as to the nature of Russian imperialism may seem beside the
point, in view of the stated purpose of this thesis "to trace the
historical backgrounds of Russian interest in Korea, to discover
the considerations which motivated this particular interest, and
to outline Russian
la."5

~tt.mpts

to a "foothold in the Korean peninsu-

However, it is evident that such a study affords a unique

vantage-point from which to view Russian expansion in the Far
East.

Without going into excess detail, it is possible to state

here that from such a study of the per10d 1860-1904, several
facts emerge qu1te clearly.

F1rst and foremost among these is

Russia's desire for an ice-free port on the Pacific, this having
been one of the major considerat1ons in view ot which the vast
Trans-Siberian Railway project was undertaken.

Another fact of

4

Sumner, "Tsardom and Imperia11sm," 26.

5

Supra, 2.
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major importance is Russia's constant encroachment on Chinese
sovereignty, always carried out under the guise ot preserving
China's territorial integrity.

From the impotent Manchus, Russia

obtained not only the right to construct railways across

Manchu~1

but also full extraterritorial rights to police the land which
the lines traversed.

Still anotper and no less decisive factor

in the evolution ot the "Korean question" i8 the growing recognition on the part ot Japan that if Korea were to fall into Rus8ian hands it would become a dagger pOinted at her ver.J heart.
Hence Japan's determination either to have Korea for herself or
to maintain there a tully independent "butfer" against Russian
aggression.
It yet remains to inquire into some of the reasons tor
the breakdown of RQssian expansion in the Far East, particularly
the breakdown of Witte's policy of "peaceful penetration" which
had netted the Tsars some ot their most substantial gains in
Asia.

It has already been noted that there was, among st. Peter.

burg foreign Circles, no little opposition to Witte.s program.
Much of this opposition focused on the degree of intensity with
which Russia was to pursue her imperialist aims in the East.While virtually all Russian statesmen of the

p~riod

accepted Rua-

sia'. "manifest destiny" in Asia as a matter:of course, there was
no general agreement as to the best means of bringing about Rus-

"

,
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sian control.
Wittefs policy, as has already been remarked, favored a
gradual economlc penetratlon by means ot the bank and the railway, rather than direct military aetlon.

A comprehensive state-

ment ot his attltude and method is afforded by a remark he once
made to a Dutoh journalIst:

"My

~otto,"

said Witte, "is trade

and industry always in the front; the army always in the rear. "7
The military and naval men, on the other hand; and to some extent
the Foreign Office as well, had adopted the dIametrically opposed
position of takIng whatever could be taken whenever a convenient
opportunity presented itself.

ThIs group favored not only strens

military measures against China, but also direct military intervention in Korea.

This ."tremist view was expressed by Minister

of the Interior Plehve, when he said:

"Bayonets, not diplomats,

have made RussiaJ by bayonets, and not by dIplomatIc pens, must
the F.r Eastern problem be solved. nS
One ot the reasons for the failure of Tsarist Imperialism as conceived by Witte was the fact that it involved a

patien~

longrrange policy, and was dependent for its ultimate success
upon a feeling of securi ty for the future.

This feeling of secul'"

ity yaq gradually being sapped and undermined by Japanese and
other foreign action, and espeoially by the faot that, after 1900,

7

Q.uoted by Sumner,· "Tsardom and Imper1a11sm," 34.

e

Quoted by Dallin,
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~
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the growth of revolutionary conditions wi thin Russia were
general confidence in the government.

shak1~

A still further reason tor

the breakdown lay in the fading away d the solid support which
had been forthcoming during the 1690'8 from most quarters of the
business world.

Wi tte' 8 railway ploject had naturally been

back$~

by. the heavy industries, and his general financial policies had
been shaped with this consideration 1n mind.

•

The general pros-

perity which marked the 90's was in part the result of, in part
the reason for, support ot the government's Far Eastern adventures.

Consequently, after the 1900 slump and criSiS, whioh hit

particularly the heavy industries and accentuated the rap1dly increasin~

political and social unrest, Far Eastern projects became

more and more open to attack.
A further reason for the breakdown of Witte's type ot
imperialism is purely personal to Witte himself and to the Tsar-yet another instance of the personal equation at work.

Through-

out the period from 1892 to his eclipse and tall from grace in
1903, Witte had stood in glaring contrast, not only with h1s predecessors, but also with the military leaders and the old-fashioned routine circles in the Russian Foreign Office.

During his

tenure of office the Finaace Ministry had become the superior ot
the Foreign Office and a

~1v~1

even of the War Office.

The 1m-

mense concentration of power which Witte exercised for ten years
came in time to arouse the jealousy and resentment of Tsar lUchola8 himself.

The particular role played by Wittefs Korean policy

"

.
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in a ttenua ting'" his already strained rela tions with the mill tar,and naval clique headed by Bezobrazov has already been related,
and this has been set down as one ot the main reasons for his
tall from grace shortly betore the outbreak ot the disastrous war
with Japan.
Subsequently, with all ,the rancor and criticism typical

ot the statesmen out ot office and unable to return to his former
station, Witte composed his Memoirs.

To be sure, all memoirs,

because of their h1ghly subject1ve character, requ1re cautious
hand11ng by the hlstorian, not the least ot these being Witte's.
However, despite certain defects 1nherent in such writings,
Wittets Memoirs enable us to see the more clearly the workings ot
certain aspects of Tsarlst Far Eastern imperia11sm at its height.
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- Discuases Korean forelgn relations rather sketchily in v. 2,
in greater detail in v. 3. Vol. 2 covers the period 18611893, vol. 3 deals with the years 1894-1911. Valuable also
for its excellent treatment of Russian flnancial and economic penetratlon in Chlna.
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Nelson, M. Frederiok, Korea
Baton Rouge, 1945.

~

tbe Old Order§, !!l Eaatem Asia,

Originally prepared as a dootoral dissertation at Duke Univerait" this volume contains an admirable exposition of
Korea's legal status up to the time of the Japanese oocupation, alao of Korean relations with China, Japan, Russia,
and the Uni ted States before 1910. Excellent17(documented.
Homanov, Boris A., Rossila v Manchchu!1.i, 1892-190•• (Russia in
Manohuria), Lenlngrad,-19~a.
The definitive work on the subject of Russian Far Eastern ,
policy and the Trans-Siberian, aa yet unavailable in English
translation. Written by an old-school Russian h1storian,
thi. work makes extensive use of the Moscow '"hives •.
Ross, John, H1stol"l!l1 Corea, Ancient

~

Modern, London, 1891.

Written by a Scottish missionary who visitod Korea before
its "opening, It this is the first history ot Korea in the
English language ~ While antiquated in style and approach .'
and reflecting many of the same shortcomings of the Bulbe.-·
work cited above, it is still ot value tor historioal back"
ground.
Sumner, B. B., ! Short Hiatorz of Russia, Revised ed., New York,
1949.
Contains a summary treatment of Russian Far Eastern policy
and foreign relations.
Treat, Payson J., D~lomatic Relations Between the United State •
.!lli! Japan, 1..85 la05, 2 vols. J Stanford, l'§!l.
Extremely valuable, drawing on previously unpublished American archive material, though reflecting so_thing of a proJapanese bIas.
Treat, Payson

J.,

The Far East: A Political
~6 Rev18ed-ea.;-Iewr!Ork,-1~S5.

and DiplomatiC Hll--. ---

A general survey of Far Eastern history. RefleetR the same
pro-Japanese blas as Treat's earlier work.
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Vernadsky, George, ! Poli tical
Boston, 1936.

~

Diplomatic Ristorz

.21 Russia,

Though containing some reflections on the nature of Russian
expansion, this' book has little to say of Tsarist Far Eastern policy as such.
Vinacke, Harold M., ! Ristor. .2.! Jm!
4th ed., New York, 194 •

m!.!.!l1!! _pdem 'l'1mea,

Contains an interesting chapter (VI) on international rivalries in Korea It the turn of the century, also "References
for further study."
B. BOOKS

Asakawa, Kanichi,

~

Russo-Japanese Conflict, Boston, 1914.

Important, for the purposes of this ltudy, for its treatment
of the causes and antecedents of the Russo-Japanese War.
Though written from the Japanese viewpoint, and based chietlyon Japanese sources, this work is remarkably objective,
well b"lanced.
Beveridge, Albert J.,

~

.Ru-.s.s.i.a.n Advance, New York, 1904.

A summary treatment of Russian expansioh written by the au
or of the monumental Life of John Marshall. The Appendix
of this volume contains £rans"iitTons of important d.ocuments,
among them the spurious Cassini Convention of 1896.
Bishop, Isabella L. (Bird), Korea

~

!!I

Neishbors, London, 189

Interesting descriptions and observations of Korea in the
period 1894-1897, generally sympathetIc to Japanese influence and reforms in the peninsula.
Bland, J. O. P., China, Japan,

.!..!!S! Korea, London, 1921.

An interesting and well-Informed though somewhat colored
treatment, pro-China in orientation.

151
Bland, J.

o.

P.~ ~-Huns-ChaPi'

London, 1917.

A good biography ot the most outstanding of Chinese statesmen, now somewhat out-dated.
Brown, Arthur Judson, 1h!. Masten 2.!.

!h! ..f!!:.!!!.;£, New York, 191

Subtitled "The StOI'1 of Korea's Transformation and Japan's
Rise to supremacy in the Or1ent,· thls work is important fo
its emphasls on the strategic positlon occupied by Korea In
the Far East.
Chirol, Valentine,

~

l!! Eastern guestion, London, 1896.

An illuminatIng contemporary study, outspokenly Britlsh in
1ts or1entation.
Colquhoun, Archibald R., China !a Transformation, New York, 1898.
A discussion ot the problem as it appeared at the time, particularly good for its dlscusslon of the southern aspects 0
Russian penetration in Chlna.
Curzon, George N., Problems 2.!

~

!!.!:!!.ll, London, 1896.

First-hand observatlons of Korea dur1ng the 1880's and 90 t a
made durlng a vlsit to the Far East, rendered more important
because of the ofrlcial positlon of the author. Shews to
what.extent Br1t~sh policy was dictated by her tradlng inte
ests in the Far East and outllnes the growth of Japanese in,
fluence In the peninsula.
Dallin, David J., 1h!.

!!!! 21. Rusala In!.!!!, New Haven, 1949.

A scholarly, up-to-date study of the means ot Russlan penetration In the Far East. The au'thor uses considerable Ru ....
sian language materi,1.
Denn~tt,

Tyler, American!

in

Eastern

Asia~ i

e• York, 1922.

A critical study of 19th century American policJ with reference to China, Japan, and Korea, based entire1J on western
sources.
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Dillon, E. J.,

~

Eclipse

~

Russia, New York, 1916.

A personal friend of and apologist for Witte, D1110n sees

Russia's "ec11pse" as stemming from the overthrow of Witte'.
program of "peaceful penetration."

Graddanze, Andrew J., Modern Korea, New York, 1944.
Prepared orig1nally 8S a doctoral d1ssertation at Columb1a
Univers1 ty, this volume prbvides a sketchy historical and
geographical setting, placing greater emphasis upon the eco
omic aspects of the later period of the Japanese protectorate.
Griffes, William E., Corea, The Hermit Natlon, 9th ed., New York,
1911.

-

Based on Western and Japanese sources, this book first appeared In l88S. Though its approach Is somewhat out-dated,
it remains a reliable source, containlng discussions on the
social and econome aspects of Korean life as well as illustrat10ns from Korean l1terature and folklore.
Hamilton, Angus, Korea, New York, 1904.
A disousslon of Korean customs and history, plaoing emphasia
on internat10nal rivalries in Korea up to the t1me of publioation.
Hlshida, Seiji, George, Japan AmOng

~

Great Powers, London,

An up-to-date revision of the author's ear11er work, The
International Posit1on of Japan as a Great Power (New-YOrk,
1905). WrItIng from the-Japanese-imperIa! poInt of view the
author presents a systematic study of Japanese d1plomacy co
oentrating mainly on the period of the Russo-Japanese War.
Hulbert, Homel"

'9., !!!!.

Passing 2.! Korea, New York, 1906.

Writt.n Qt tho time when Korea was losing its independence,
this book, based largely on the same author's Histotl of
Korea, already cited, was designed chiefly to fUrther the
cause of Korean independence.
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Hsu, Shushi, China ~ ~ Political Entitl, New York, 1926.
A study of the Korean and Manchurian problems, based chiefly
on Chinese sources. Quite valuable.
Kent, Percy R., Railwal Enterprise !e China, London, 1907.
In general, the best single account of the struggle for
railway concessions in China.
Korfr, (Baron) S. A., Russia 1!!

~ l!!~, Washi~lion,

1921.

A survey in pamphlet for.m of Ruszian penetration into Siberia, with discussions of Russian relations with China,
Japan, and Mongolia.
Krausse, Alexis, ~
London, 1900.

l!.!: !!..!!, .!!! Historz

~

A substantial tre~tment of the question
the time, now somewhat outdated.
Krausse, Alexis, Russia in As1a:
lew York, 1899.
-- ----

1l! Sue"stion,

98

it appeared at

!. Record .!m! ! studl,

.!§!?!-18QQ

Comment on preceding work also applies here.
Lobanov-Rostovsky, (Prince) Andrei, Russia

~

Asia, New York,

1933.

Written by the son of the former Russian Foreign Minister,
Alexis Lobanov-Rostovsky, this volume presents a general
survey of Russian Far Eastern relations. Interesting and
reliable, but not revelatory.
Norman, Henry,
1895.

~

Peo!:!le • .!!.19. Poli tics

.2!

~

l:!.!!!!.!:,

New

Yo~

One of the best informed and most interesting analyses of
the situation as it appeared at the time, written by a man
widely traveled in the Far East. Contains rather acute predictions of things to come in the East, most of which have
been borne out by history.
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Owen, Davld E., Imserla1ism and Natlonallsm in the Far East,
New York, 1§2 •
- A rather superficial survey, contains little that cannot be
found in more substantial form elsewhere.
Pasvolsky, Leo, Russia

~ ~

!!I!!!!,

Hew York, 1922.

Much the same account as offered by the Lobanov-Rostovsky
work clted above.
Rookh111, William W., Chlna's Intercourse with Korea from the
~ Centua !2lm, 1::onoon, 1:§a5. -A treatment of Koreats tributary relatlonship to Chlna up t
the time that relationship was destroyed by the Sino-Japanese War. Based largely on Chinese sources.
Sands, Willlam F., Undiplomatic MemorHts, New York, 1930.
The author was secretary to the American Legation in Seoul
1n 1894, later became advisor to the Korean emperor up to
1904. The recollections contalned in this volume have
11ttle to say on Russian pollcy in Korea.
Skrine, Francis H. B., 1!!! Ex,pansion
bridge, 1903.
'

~

RuSSia, l§l2-l900, Cam-

A substantial work, but rather o~tdated in its approach.
Though treating Russian expansion in Slberia in 80me detail,
bas little to say of Korea.
Takeuchi, Sterling '1'., .War
New York, 1935.

~

DiJ210macl

!!!
.

~

Japanese Empire,

Prepared as a doctoral dissertation at Yale and based on
Japanese sources, this volume presents an illuminating stud
of Japanese internal organlzation after the 18e8 revolution.
"Vladim1r,"

~

China-JaRan

!!£,

London, 1896.

On the whole, a quite reliable contemporary history of the
war; uses oriental as .ell as western sources.
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Yakhontoft, Victor A., Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far
East, New York, 1931.
- --

-QUite good,

but rather sketchy on the period here considered

Zakr1skie, Edward H., American-Russian RivalrY in the Far Eastl
A Study in Di210macI and Power POlitIcs, 1~5=I91~PhIIi.
'!elphla,-r946.
An excellent analysis of the American-Russian antagonism,
drawing quite heavily on Russian sources.
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